Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and Charitable Giving Tax Provisions by Chodorow, Adam
BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 4 Article 3
5-1-2011
Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine
Healthcare and Charitable Giving Tax Provisions
Adam Chodorow
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adam Chodorow, Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and Charitable Giving Tax Provisions, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1041
(2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss4/3
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:30 PM 
 
1041 
Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare 
and Charitable Giving Tax Provisions 
Adam Chodorow 
 This Article considers two unrelated tax provisions—health care 
Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) and the charitable deduction. FSAs 
permit eligible taxpayers to set income aside tax-free to use for medical 
expenses. However, these accounts have a “use-it-or-lose-it” feature that 
discourages participation and creates incentives for unnecessary 
spending at year-end. The charitable deduction is available only to those 
who itemize their deductions, thus negating the incentive to give for the 
65% of taxpayers who take the standard deduction. Prior attempts to fix 
these provisions separately—allowing taxpayers to roll over unused FSA 
amounts to the next year and moving some or all of the charitable 
deduction “above the line”—have failed. 
I propose combining the two provisions by allowing taxpayers to 
donate unused FSA amounts to charity. Doing so would lower a key 
impediment to participation in FSAs while giving a functional above-
the-line deduction (and relief from payroll taxes) to those who donate 
through this mechanism. Not only would this reform increase the 
efficacy of both provisions, but it should also avoid many of the pitfalls of 
prior stand-alone reform efforts. 
 
  Professor of Law at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State 
University, Tempe, Arizona. I would like to thank Ellen Aprill, Miranda Fleischer, Brian Galle, 
and the participants at the University of Illinois faculty workshop, the University of San 
Diego’s Tax Speaker Series, and the Boston College Tax Policy Workshop for comments on 
earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to thank Mark Molique for his outstanding help as a 
research assistant.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing national debate over health care reform has 
revealed a deep divide over how best to promote social welfare. 
Regardless of this debate’s outcome, one thing seems certain: tax 
incentives will remain an important tool in advancing health care 
policy. The insurance mandate and associated penalty have received 
the lion’s share of media attention, yet a number of other provisions 
play an important role in encouraging individuals to acquire health 
insurance, save for their medical needs, and monitor their 
expenditures. In this article, I focus on health care flexible spending 
accounts (FSAs),1 which permit taxpayers to set aside money tax-free 
for medical needs. 
Largely ignored by legal academics,2 FSAs loom large in the 
minds of those eligible to participate. Before each tax year begins, 
taxpayers must estimate their unreimbursed medical expenses for the 
upcoming year.3 If they choose to participate, they must make an 
irrevocable election to set aside money to cover such expenses on a 
tax-free basis. FSAs are subject to a “use-it-or-lose-it” rule. Thus, if 
taxpayers overestimate their needs, they must either race to spend 
unused amounts on items they would not otherwise have purchased 
or forfeit those amounts to their employer. 
As discussed more fully below, although most taxpayers consider 
FSAs to be a form of tax-favored savings account, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) considers them to be a form of health 
insurance. Many of the rules that make FSAs so ineffective, such as 
the use-it-or-lose-it rule, can be explained in large part by this fact. 
No data exists regarding how much time and energy taxpayers spend 
trying to assess their anticipated medical expenses, how many 
taxpayers underfund their accounts, or how many spend unused 
money at year-end to avoid forfeiture. However, of the 
 
 1. As described, see infra note 31, the rules provide for both health care and dependent 
care FSAs, which allow taxpayers to set aside money tax-free to be used for dependent care 
expenses. Unless otherwise indicated, I use FSA in this article to refer to health care FSAs. 
 2. As described more fully later, see infra Part II.C, there is a growing body of 
economics literature assessing the efficacy of FSAs as a health policy tool. 
 3. For a description of the rules governing health care FSAs, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.125-5, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,957–60 (Aug. 6, 2007). 
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approximately 40% of U.S. employees eligible for such accounts, 
only 22%—about 8% of all U.S. employees—participate in FSAs.4 
The charitable deduction is also viewed by many as being deeply 
flawed. Some criticize the deduction because it provides an “upside-
down” subsidy, where high-income taxpayers receive a greater 
benefit than low-income taxpayers.5 Others focus on the fact that 
some taxpayers are allowed to deduct the full market value of 
donated property while others are limited to deducting basis.6 
However, the issue that has received the most attention has been the 
placement of the deduction “below the line,” so that it is not 
available to the approximately 65% of taxpayers who take the 
standard deduction.7 
To date, stand-alone efforts to fix the perceived problems with 
these provisions—by allowing taxpayers to roll unused amounts over 
to the next year and by moving some or all of the charitable 
deduction “above the line”—have failed.8 In this Article, I propose a 
novel solution that merges the two provisions by allowing taxpayers 
to donate unused funds in their FSAs at year-end to charity.  
My proposal has several benefits over the stand-alone fixes 
previously proposed. First, combining the two provisions is likely to 
increase the incentive both to save for medical needs and to donate 
to charity. Taxpayers will be more likely to participate and fully fund 
their FSAs if they know unused amounts will go to charity instead of 
being retained by their employers. Because amounts contributed to 
 
 4. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2009, at tbl.36 (Sept. 2009) 
(describing the percentage of U.S. employees eligible to participate in health care FSAs); 
MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, NATIONAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
HEALTH PLANS, ll. 619–20 (2008) (describing the health care FSA participation rates for 
eligible employees). 
 5. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 22, 134 (1973). 
 6. See Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the 
Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2002). 
 7. The line in question is one that differentiates deductions that are used to determine 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and those that are not. Deductions used to determine AGI are 
taken “above the line” and are available to all taxpayers. Below-the-line deductions may be 
taken only by those who itemize their deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 63, 67, 68 (2006). For data 
on the number of people who itemize, see I.R.S., SOI TAX STATS-INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 (COMPLETE REPORT) 32 tbl.1.2, 68 tbl.2.1 (2005), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inalcr.pdf. The 35% who itemize accounted for 80.5% 
of all income tax revenue raised in 2005. See id. 
 8. See infra Part IV.  
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FSAs are exempt from income, all taxpayers who donate to charity 
through this mechanism will receive the equivalent of an above-the-
line deduction. Second, the proposal is likely to be both less 
expensive and administratively easier than moving some or all of the 
charitable deduction above the line. Finally, the proposal is likely to 
garner more political support than earlier, stand-alone proposals, if 
for no other reason than both charitable organizations and those 
eligible for FSAs will join forces to support it. 
Part II of this Article considers the different ways in which 
Congress has used the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C., Tax Code or 
Code) to encourage people to acquire insurance or otherwise 
provide for medical needs. Part III examines the charitable 
deduction. Part IV reviews prior efforts to remedy the perceived 
flaws in both the charitable deduction and FSA provisions. Part V 
contains the detailed proposal to allow taxpayers to donate unused 
funds in an FSA at the end of the year to charity and evaluates the 
proposal in light of concerns raised about prior attempts to reform 
these provisions. While the IRS could adopt this proposal 
administratively without changing the nature of FSAs, I argue that 
Congress should instead take this opportunity to recast FSAs as tax-
favored savings accounts and conform them to the way most people 
think about and use them. 
II. HEALTHCARE POLICY IN THE TAX CODE 
The Tax Code contains a number of provisions allowing 
taxpayers to deduct, exclude from income, or receive tax-free 
insurance and reimbursement of amounts spent on medical care. 
Some argue that these provisions are appropriate as a matter of 
income measurement.9 However, most agree that provisions in the 
Code related to healthcare spending are subsidies.10 
 
 9. For example, the Schanz-Haig-Simons income definition posits that income equals 
consumption plus change in wealth over an accounting period. See HENRY C. SIMONS, 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL 
POLICY 50 (1938). Most arguments regarding the propriety of deducting medical expenses 
focus on the question of whether medical expenditures constitute consumption. See, e.g., 
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 314 
(1972) (arguing that medical expenditures should not be considered consumption and 
therefore should be deductible). For an opposing view, see, for example, Mark G. Kelman, 
Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an ‘Ideal’ Income Tax and Why They Fit 
Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979) (arguing that spending on 
medical needs is a form of consumption). Thomas Griffith, who contends that the deductibility 
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To understand FSAs, it helps to understand where they fit in the 
panoply of tax provisions that affect healthcare. This Part considers 
the structure and efficacy of these provisions, which can be broken 
down into three main types. The first allows a deduction for medical 
spending above a set floor. The second allows taxpayers to exclude 
from income the value of employer-provided health insurance and 
amounts received under such plans. The third allows taxpayers to 
exclude from income amounts they save and then spend on medical 
expenses. Despite the financial incentives these provisions provide, 
most have failed to live up to their promise. 
 
 
 
 
of a medical expense should depend on whether it increases overall societal welfare, notes that 
Andrew’s argument is actually based on the impact of medical expenditures on a taxpayer’s 
ability to pay taxes, as opposed to a definition of consumption. See Thomas D. Griffith, 
Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 366–77 (1989). 
  If a deduction for medical expenses is warranted, a deduction for amounts paid for 
health insurance or the exclusion of the value of health insurance received from one’s employer 
is also warranted. Premiums for health insurance represent the expected value of medical 
expenses over the coverage period. Allowing a deduction for such expenses or excluding the 
receipt of insurance from income is tantamount to allowing a deduction when medical 
expenses are incurred. See Jay A. Soled, Taxation of Employer-Provided Health Coverage: 
Inclusion, Timing and Policy Issues, 15 VA. TAX REV. 447, 452–465 (1996) (arguing for the 
exclusion from income of employer-provided health care on income-definition grounds). 
 10. The concept of the tax expenditure/subsidy was championed by Stanley Surrey, a 
Harvard professor who served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy. 
He also championed the idea of compiling an annual tax expenditure budget to track how 
much money Congress spent indirectly by giving tax preferences to subsets of taxpayers. See 
SURREY, supra note 5. 
  Tax expenditures have received significant criticism for complicating the Tax Code, 
obscuring government spending, and distorting the budgeting process. See, e.g., Edward D. 
Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and 
Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010). However, given the self-executing 
nature of spending programs that run through the Tax Code, they may be more efficient than 
direct spending programs. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and 
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 979–80 (2004). To the extent that they are designed 
to redistribute income, they may be more efficient than stand-alone legal rules. See Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). In fact, the decision to integrate 
spending into the Tax Code is more properly a question of institutional design. Weisbach & 
Nussim, supra, at 957–61. 
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A. Deductions for Medical Expenses 
I.R.C. § 213 allows a deduction for certain medical expenses 
above a floor. Congress added the predecessor to § 213 to the Tax 
Code in 1942, when it converted the income tax into a mass tax to 
help pay for World War II.11 The current version permits taxpayers 
to deduct medical expenses that exceed 7.5% of their AGI.12 As part 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Patient 
Protection Act), this threshold will rise to 10% of AGI in 2013.13 
Because this medical expense deduction falls below the line, it is 
available only to those who itemize their deductions.14 
The legislative history reveals that Congress did not see the 
provision as necessary for income measurement; rather it viewed the 
provision as a tool for affecting public policy.15 This is not to say that 
the provision is a tax incentive. The point is not to provide financial 
incentives for people to incur medical expenses. Rather, it provides 
relief to those who suffer extraordinary injury by freeing up resources 
to pay for medical care that might otherwise not be available. 
Allowing a deduction for medical expenses is justified because it 
supposedly enhances overall societal welfare.16 
 
 11. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619 § 127(a), 56 Stat. 825 (current version at I.R.C. § 
213 (2006)). 
 12. See I.R.C. § 213 (2006). AGI is defined at I.R.C. § 62(a). 
 13. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
9013(a), 124 Stat. 119, 868 (2010). Taxpayers who turn 65 in 2013 through 2106 will be 
able to use the 7.5% figure for those years. Id. § 9013(b). 
 14. See I.R.C. § 62 (2006). Medical expenses are not considered “miscellaneous 
itemized deductions” and therefore are not subject to the 2% floor set forth in I.R.C. § 67. 
Medical expenditures are also not limited by I.R.C. § 68, which reduces certain itemized 
deductions for those whose income exceeds a floor. 
 15. During the hearings on the bill, a National Association of Retail Druggists 
representative testified that an allowance for medical expenses was ostensibly included in the 
personal exemption and that the proposal in the pending bill to significantly lower the 
exemption would in effect subject medical expenses to tax for the first time. See Revenue Act of 
1942: Hearing on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong. 1675–78 (statement 
of Rowland Jones, Jr., Washington Rep. of the National Association of Retail Druggists). He 
expressed fear that people would defer medical expenses in response to the increased tax 
liability to their own detriment and that of the country generally. The Association thus argued 
for full deductibility of all expenses. See id. at 1678. Others supported the Treasury 
Department’s proposal that only extraordinary expenses be covered. See, e.g., id. at 2204 
(statement submitted by Paul J. Kern, Committee on National Taxation, National Lawyer’s 
Guild). In the end, Congress allowed taxpayers to deduct expenses above 5% of their AGI for 
expenses paid for medical care, with a maximum deduction of $2500 for a head of family. See § 
127(a), 56 Stat. at 825. 
 16. See Griffith, supra note 9, at 370. 
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B. Employer Provided Health Insurance 
By far the largest tax subsidy for healthcare can be found in 
I.R.C. §§ 105, 106, 3101(a)–(b), and 3121(a)(2). These provisions 
exclude from income and payroll taxes amounts employers pay to 
insure their employees and amounts employees receive under health 
and accident plans, whether in the form of direct payments to 
doctors or reimbursement of employee-incurred expenses.17 
However, these provisions were not originally intended as subsidies. 
The issue of including employer-paid insurance premiums as income 
first arose in 1919, when the IRS held that payments for individual 
policies counted as income to the employee. However, the next year 
the IRS ruled that premiums for group insurance were not income, 
on the theory that such expenditures were for the benefit of the 
employer and not the employee.18 At this point, only a small number 
of Americans were subject to the income tax, so the ruling had little 
practical effect. 
Two things happened during World War II to thrust the 
exemption for group insurance into the spotlight and make it 
relevant to a large number of taxpayers. First, the income tax was 
converted into a mass tax, which caused a large number of people to 
become subject to it. Second, the National War Labor Board 
decided to freeze wages. Given the shortage of workers, employers 
sought creative ways to get around the wage controls. One option 
was to offer health insurance.19 In 1943, the Labor Board held that 
fringe benefits—including health insurance—would not be 
considered salary for purposes of the wage freeze, thus giving a 
significant boost to employer-provided health insurance.20 Congress 
later codified the exclusion of health insurance from income as 
I.R.C. § 106. As a result, the government now subsidizes the 
purchase of health insurance, at least for those lucky enough to work 
for employers who offer this benefit. 
 
 17. By one estimate, the government subsidy created by these provisions amounted to 
$202 billion in 2004. It is routinely the largest tax expenditure in the Code. See Richard L. 
Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of 
American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 553–54 (2005). 
 18. For a discussion of this early history, see Soled, supra note 9, at 450. 
 19. See EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., HISTORY OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
(Mar. 2002), available at http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=0302fact; see 
also T.D. 5295, 1943 C.B. 1193. 
 20. See EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., supra note 19.  
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The provision of tax-free health insurance to employees involves 
an implicit negotiation between employers and employees over the 
form their compensation will take. While employees are not given 
the express choice of receiving cash or an equivalent amount of 
health insurance, in effect those who accept health insurance are 
almost certainly taking home less salary than they otherwise would. 
Normally, those who choose between cash and some other benefit 
are deemed to be in constructive receipt of cash, and therefore must 
include the value of the benefit in income.21 However, perhaps 
because employees are not making an express tradeoff, they are not 
deemed in constructive receipt of any income by virtue of receiving 
health insurance. 
The efficacy of the benefit provided by I.R.C. § 106 is limited. 
Not only is the benefit available to a limited number of taxpayers,22 
but costs for health insurance have also risen dramatically. By one 
recent estimate, approximately 50 million people in the U.S. are 
without health insurance.23 Those who have employer-sponsored 
insurance are being asked to shoulder more and more of the costs of 
health insurance directly.24 The Patient Protection Act addresses 
some of these problems by mandating that people obtain health 
insurance and by providing subsidies to those who cannot afford to 
do so. However, the Act still relies heavily on employer-sponsored 
insurance and the associated tax incentives as the primary tool for 
expanding coverage.25 If Republicans succeed in repealing the law or 
otherwise blocking its implementation, as they have threatened, the 
existing problems are likely to persist. 
 
 21. See Soled, supra note 9, at 479–80. 
 22. While virtually all full-time state and local government workers were offered 
retirement and medical benefits, in the private sector only 69% of workers were offered medical 
benefits. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States–
March 2011 (July 26, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnr0017.txt. Only 22% of 
private sector workers had access to medical care benefits amongst the lowest 10% of wage 
earners. Id. 
 23. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FIVE FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED 
(2010), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7806-03.pdf. 
 24. See, e.g., Noam N. Levey, Workers Bearing Brunt of Higher Health-Care Costs, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 3, 2010, at A5. 
 25. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1501(a)(2)(D), 124 Stat. 119, 242 (finding that near-universal coverage will be achieved “by 
building upon and strengthening the private employer-based health insurance system”). 
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C. Cafeteria Plans and FSAs 
In 1978, Congress added I.R.C. § 125 to the Code, creating 
“cafeteria plans.” These plans allow taxpayers to make explicit 
choices between receiving cash or qualified tax-favored benefits 
without running afoul of the constructive receipt rules.26 A key 
feature of qualifying benefits is that, with a few important exceptions, 
they may not involve deferred compensation.27 Section 125 opened 
the door for FSAs, which allow employees to elect to set aside part of 
their salary and use it to pay their medical expenses.28 Money 
contributed is exempt from both income and payroll taxes.29 
However, any amount not used at the end of the year is forfeited to 
the employer.30 Until recently, the law imposed no limits on the 
amount that could be contributed to an FSA, though employers 
often set a $5000 limit.31 As part of the Patient Protection Act, 
Congress has limited the amount that can be contributed to $2500 
starting in 2013.32 In addition, starting in 2011, over-the-counter 
 
 26. See I.R.C. § 125(a) (2006). 
 27. See id. § 125(d)(2)(A). 
 28. The current rules are contained in Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.125-5, 72 
Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,957 (Aug. 6, 2007). Some health care FSAs involve only employer 
contributions. Such plans are not covered under I.R.C. § 125. Instead they are viewed as a 
form of employer-provided insurance under I.R.C. §§ 105 and 106. I focus here only on 
health care FSAs that are part of a cafeteria plan. 
 29. See I.R.C. §§ 105, 3121(a). 
 30. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,942 (discussing the “Use-or-
Lose Rule” as satisfying cafeteria plan requirement of I.R.C. § 125(d)(2)(A) prohibiting 
deferral of compensation). 
 31. FSAs also exist for dependent care. Under such plans, taxpayers may put away 
money to be used to pay for dependent care on a tax-free basis. Many of the same issues that 
exist for health care FSAs exist for dependent care FSAs. I do not focus on these accounts in 
this Article, but many of the same arguments could be made. Section 129 of the Code imposes 
a $5,000 limit for dependent care FSAs, and it appears that many plans similarly limit 
contributions to health care FSAs. See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2 Q&A (7)(f) ex. 2 
(1989); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(c), 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,942. According to a 2007 study 
by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit plans, 54% of its members capped 
contributions at some amount up to $4,999, and 42% capped contributions at $5000 or more. 
Unfortunately, the report does not indicate how many of that 42% capped contributions at 
exactly $5000. See INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, FLEXIBLE BENEFIT PLANS AND 
FSAS 5 (2007). The Federal FSA plan limits contributions to $5000. See JANEMARIE MULVEY, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32656, HEALTH CARE FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS 6 
(2010). 
 32. See I.R.C. § 125(i) (2006), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1403(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1063. 
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drugs will no longer be eligible for reimbursement from such 
accounts.33 
To most employees, FSAs look and function like tax-favored 
savings accounts. Employees contribute their own money and then 
recover it by submitting receipts documenting their health care 
expenditures. However, to the IRS, FSAs are a form of employer-
provided health insurance. The characterization of FSAs as insurance 
has led to many of the rules that make FSAs difficult to use, 
contributing to the low participation rates discussed more fully 
below. To understand why the FSA rules are so restrictive, it helps to 
trace their history. 
With the introduction of cafeteria plans in 1978, employees were 
permitted for the first time to direct their salary dollars towards the 
purchase of health insurance, including plans that would reimburse 
them directly for their medical expenses. Some early plans 
overreached, allowing employees to submit medical expenses to their 
employers, who then characterized an equal amount of the 
employees’ normal salary as a reimbursement and therefore arguably 
exempt from tax.34 In early 1984, the IRS announced that any 
amounts received under such plans did not qualify for tax exclusion 
under I.R.C. § 125.35 
Later that year, the Treasury Department issued proposed 
regulations setting forth the first guidance on what was necessary for 
an FSA to qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 125.36 The 
regulations stated that any benefit that allowed participants to carry 
unused amounts over from one year to the next could not be offered 
in a cafeteria plan because carryover would amount to deferred 
compensation in violation of I.R.C. § 125(d)(2).37 Without stating a 
basis for the ruling, the regulations further required that in cafeteria 
plans employees must elect benefits before the benefits become 
available38 (i.e., before the tax year begins) and prohibited employees 
 
 33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
9003, 124 Stat. 119, 854 (2010). 
 34. See I.R.S. Announcement 84-24, 1984-10 I.R.B. 39 (Mar. 5, 1984); I.R.S. News 
Release IR-84-22 (Feb 10, 1984). 
 35. See I.R.S. Announcement 84-24, 1984-10 I.R.B. 39; I.R.S. News Release IR-84-22. 
 36. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,322, 19,322–29 (May 7, 1984). 
 37. See id. at 19,324, Q&A 7. 
 38. See id. at 19,325, Q&A 15. 
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from revoking their elections, even as to future contributions, absent 
a change in family status.39 
In 1989, the Treasury Department issued another set of 
proposed regulations, further clarifying the rules governing FSAs.40 
These rules attempted to distinguish between medical expenses 
deductible under I.R.C. § 213 and amounts received tax-free under 
an FSA. In particular, the Treasury was concerned that FSAs were 
being used to allow employees to deduct their first dollar of medical 
expenses in contravention of the policy implicit in I.R.C. § 213, 
which had a floor of 7.5% of AGI. The regulations made clear that to 
qualify as a tax-free benefit FSAs had to function like insurance 
contracts described in I.R.C. § 106. To this end, the employer must 
bear a meaningful risk of loss, thus creating an incentive to guard 
against adverse selection by employees and inappropriate 
reimbursement of employee expenses.41 
The regulations cast employee contributions as “premiums” and 
describe reimbursements as recovery on a claim, not simply receiving 
back one’s own money. For most plans, the coverage purchased is 
equal to the amount of premiums paid, though employers can create 
plans where amounts paid out exceed the premiums paid by up to 
500%.42 While few would ever consider buying an insurance policy 
where the benefits equal the premiums paid, the tax savings 
associated with FSAs make them economically attractive to 
employees.43 
Consistent with traditional insurance policies, employees need 
not wait until they have contributed the full amount (paid their 
premiums in full) before seeking reimbursement (making a claim).44 
 
 39. See id. at 19,324, Q&A 8. In 2000, the Treasury Department issued final 
regulations addressing what constituted a change in status that would allow FSA participants to 
change their elections. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.125-4, 66 Fed. Reg. 1837, 1840 (Jan. 10,  
2001). 
 40. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, 54 Fed. Reg. 9468 (March 7, 1989). 
 41. Cf. id. at 9482, Q&A 7(a).  
 42. See id. at 9483, Q&A 7(f). 
43.  A simple numeric example illustrates why the tax savings associated with FSAs make 
them economically attractive to employees. If a taxpayer earns $100, contributes it to an FSA, 
and incurs medical costs of $80, the taxpayer loses $20 at the end of the year. However, he 
only needs to earn $100 to cover $80 of healthcare. If the taxpayer decides not to contribute 
to an FSA to avoid the risk of forfeiture, he must earn $133.33 to pay for $80 of medical care, 
assuming a tax rate of 40%. As a result, he is better off participating in the FSA even though he 
forfeits money. 
 44. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, 54 Fed. Reg. at 9482, Q&A 7(f) (stating that 
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Thus, an employee who elects to contribute $5,000 and incurs a 
large medical expense in January can get full reimbursement 
immediately even though it will take a full year for her employer to 
withhold the entire amount elected. It is this feature that creates the 
risk for the employer and makes the plan look like insurance in the 
eyes of the IRS. If the employee were to leave her employment in 
February, no mechanism exists for the employer to claw back 
amounts reimbursed in excess of her contributions. 
Payments must be for expenses incurred during the coverage 
period, which must last the entire year to prevent employees from 
seeking coverage only during times of the year when they know they 
will have expenses.45 Only qualified medical expenses described in 
I.R.C. § 213 are reimbursable.46 Although the IRS significantly 
broadened covered expenditures in 2003 by ruling that 
reimbursement of amounts paid to purchase nonprescription drugs 
were permissible within an FSA,47 the Patient Protection Act 
rescinded this rule starting in 2011.48 Thus, only medical services, 
devices, and prescription drugs will be covered, making FSAs less 
attractive to many users. Finally, to be reimbursed, employees must 
submit a written statement from an independent third party (i.e., a 
receipt) describing the nature and amount of the expense.49 
The 1984 regulations made clear that participants forfeited any 
unused amounts. The 1989 regulations set forth the appropriate use 
of such funds, which are described as “experience gains.”50 Such 
amounts may be used to reduce premiums in future years, or they 
may be returned to the FSA participants as dividends or premium 
refunds. However, any amounts returned in this manner cannot be 
based on the actual experience of any given participant. Thus, 
someone who has $100 left in his account cannot expect to receive a 
$100 reduction in future premiums or a $100 premium refund. 
Instead, the total amount left over in the fund must be allocated 
among all participants based on some neutral principle. 
 
reimbursements must be available at all times during the period of coverage). 
 45. See id. at 9482–83, Q&A 7(3). 
 46. See id. at 9483, Q&A 7(4). 
 47. See Rev. Rul. 03-102, 2003-38 I.R.B. 559. 
 48. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
9003, 124 Stat. 119, 854 (2010). 
 49. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, 54 Fed. Reg. at 9467. 
 50. See id. 
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In 2007, the Treasury Department issued another set of 
proposed regulations to replace those issued in 1984 and 1989.51 
The new proposed § 1.125-5 is devoted solely to FSAs and 
continues much of what came before. It reaffirms the use-it-or-lose-
it feature but allows employers to give employees a two-and-a-half 
month grace period after the end of the year to spend unused funds 
on the theory that such a short grace period does not run afoul of 
the bar on deferred compensation.52 It also continues the 
requirement that FSAs have insurance-like characteristics, making 
clear that reimbursements must conform to the rules of § 105. The 
regulation further clarifies that employers may retain unused 
premiums, use them to defray administrative costs, lessen future 
premiums, or refund the premiums to employees, so long as they do 
so on a uniform and reasonable basis.53 
The rules described above make sense if one wants to make FSAs 
look like insurance policies; they make little sense if one wants 
employees to make full use of FSAs. They depress participation 
because eligible taxpayers either decide not to participate or 
underfund their accounts to avoid the risk of forfeiture. They also 
engender significant frustration among eligible taxpayers and create 
incentives for participants to incur unnecessary medical expenses.54 
The people for whom FSAs work the best are those with predictable, 
periodic medical expenses, such as prescription drugs not covered by 
insurance, or orthodontia. For those with less predictable medical 
expenses, the forfeiture rule, when combined with the requirement 
that employees make an irrevocable election on how much to set 
aside before the year begins, creates a significant risk that employees 
will lose some of the money they set aside.55 
 
 51. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938-4001 (Aug. 6, 2007). 
 52. The IRS had announced this policy in 2005. See I.R.S. Notice 05-42, 2005-232 
I.R.B. 1204. Not all employers have opted to amend their plans to allow this. 
 53. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,943. 
 54. See Daniel Kadlec, Inflexible-Spending Accounts, TIME, Oct. 21, 2002, at 86, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003493-1,00.html 
(describing the purchase of new eyeglass frames and other medical services at the end of the 
year to avoid forfeiting amounts remaining in FSAs). 
 55. While it is possible that participants could get some money back in the form of 
reduced future contributions or premium refunds, few health care FSAs appear to return 
money to FSA participants in one of these two ways. I have heard anecdotally that the 
University of Minnesota’s FSA plan made unused amounts available to other participants. I do 
not have any concrete evidence of how widespread this practice is. 
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According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics National 
Compensation Survey, as of 2009 only 39% of all workers were 
eligible to enroll in FSAs.56 As of 2002 only about 12% of those 
eligible to enroll in such plans do so.57 Nonetheless, the trend has 
been an increase in participation: a 2008 Mercer Survey revealed that 
21% of those eligible participated in 2007, while 22% participated in 
2008.58 In 2008, the average contribution for those who did 
participate was $1,380.59 Unfortunately, no data is available on the 
relationship this number bears to the average actual medical 
expenses. Thus, there is no way to know the extent to which people 
underfund FSAs to avoid a possible forfeiture penalty. 
Data regarding the number of people who forfeit money 
suggests that most people spend all the money in their accounts. 
According to an International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans 
survey from 2006, 62% of the respondent employers reported that 
less than 7% of FSA participants forfeited any money. Another 6% of 
respondent employers reported that between 20% and 29% of 
participants forfeited money, while a full 30% of these employers did 
not have information on forfeitures.60 When people do forfeit funds, 
the data suggests that they forfeit very small amounts. The 
International Foundation survey reveals that 51% of respondents 
reported average forfeiture amounts under $300, and only 6% 
reported higher average amounts. Again, 30% of respondents did not 
have data on forfeitures.61 
 
 56. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY (Sept. 
2009). The survey includes “civilian” workers, which excludes federal employees, who do have 
access to such plans. Among those who had the ability to participate, the numbers were skewed 
heavily towards those in higher tax brackets. Id. In addition, this benefit was skewed towards 
companies with more than 100 employees, with approximately 83% of all such companies 
offering FSAs, comprising 51% of all workers. See MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, 2009 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS (2009), 
http://www.mercer.com/survey-reports/2009-US-national-health-plan-survey (purchase 
required); see also INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 3 (indicating that 
73% of employers reported a participation rate at or below 39%; 20% reported a higher rate, 
and 7% did not know their participation rates). 
 57. See Kadlec, supra note 54, at 86. 
 58. See MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, supra note 56. 
 59. See id.; see also INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 5 
(showing that 74% reported contributions under $3000, 2.4% reported higher contributions, 
and 24% did not have data on this question). 
 60. See INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 6. 
 61. See id. 
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It is not clear whether these forfeiture rates and amounts reflect 
that people are good at estimating their annual medical expenses, 
underfund their accounts to avoid the risk of forfeiture, or race out 
to spend money at the end of the year to avoid forfeiture. Nor is 
there any data on the amount of time spent trying to calculate 
anticipated medical expenses so as not to overfund FSAs. It is almost 
impossible to obtain this information. However, if the conversations 
in which I have participated while writing this article are indicative, 
people spend significant time trying to estimate their medical 
expenses. Moreover, intentional underfunding and last-minute 
spending sprees are the principal causes of the relatively low 
forfeiture rates and amounts. 
D. Tax-Favored Health Savings Accounts 
While FSAs appear to most users to be tax-favored savings 
accounts, Congress has created actual tax-favored savings accounts as 
part of its plan to encourage taxpayers to sign up for high deductible 
health insurance plans. Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), later 
renamed Archer MSAs, were created in 1996 on an experimental 
basis to rein in the rapid growth in health care costs.62 The notion 
was that high-deductible plans would be less expensive than 
traditional health insurance, thus prompting more people to acquire 
insurance. Moreover, consumers would be more cost conscious if 
they had to pay for medical costs out of pocket, at least until their 
deductibles were reached. To encourage taxpayers to elect such 
plans, Congress allowed taxpayers to receive an above-the-line 
deduction for amounts contributed to Archer MSAs.63 If such plans 
were part of a cafeteria plan, contributed amounts were also 
exempted from payroll taxes.64 Amounts in an Archer MSA could be 
spent on qualifying medical expenses without the taxpayer incurring 
any tax liability.65 Any unused amounts were rolled over to the next 
 
 62. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at I.R.C. § 220 (2006)). For the provision renaming the 
accounts, see Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 202 app. 
G, 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-628 to -629 (2000). 
 63. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(16), 220 (2006). For participants on Medicare, direct 
contributions by Health and Human Services were also excluded from a taxpayer’s income. See 
id. § 138. 
 64. See EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, I.R.S. Pub. 15-B, at 15 (May 
24, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf. 
 65. See I.R.C. § 220(d)(2), (f). Amounts not spent on such expenses were subject to tax 
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year. Unlike FSAs, taxpayers could invest funds contributed to an 
Archer MSA as they wished, and any returns on such investment 
were also exempt from tax.66 
As noted, Archer MSAs were experimental. As a result, they had 
a number of features that hampered their acceptance. They had a 
definite end date,67 only a limited number of accounts could be 
created,68 and only self-employed individuals or those who worked 
for companies with fewer than fifty employees were allowed to create 
them.69 In 2001, only about 80,000 accounts were set up, far below 
the 750,000 limit Congress established.70 
In 2003, Congress created a permanent version of Archer MSAs, 
called Health Savings Accounts (HSAs).71 Like MSAs, these accounts 
may only be used in conjunction with high-deductible insurance 
policies.72 Both employers and employees may contribute to HSAs, 
although annual contributions are limited. For 2011, the limits are 
$3,050 for an individual and $6,150 for a family, though people 
over fifty-five years old may contribute an extra $1,000.73 Those who 
participate in an FSA are not eligible to contribute to an HSA.74 
 
and a penalty. See id. § 220(f)(1)–(2), (4). 
 66. See I.R.C. § 220(e). 
 67. The end date was extended twice, for a total of three years. See Community Renewal 
Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 201(a) app. G, 114 Stat. 2763A-587 to -628 
(providing for a two-year extension of availability for medical savings accounts); Job Creation 
and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 612(a), 116 Stat. 21, 61 (2002) 
(providing for a one-year extension). 
 68. See I.R.C. § 220(j)(2)(A)(ii). 
 69. See id. §§ 220(c)(1)(A)(iii)(I)–(II), 401(c)(1)(B). 
 70. See I.R.S. Announcement 02-90, 2002-2 C.B. 684 (explaining that there were 
78,913 MSAs created in 2001). 
 71. See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (primarily amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000)). The 
Act added § 223 to the Code. 
 72. High deductible insurance is defined as insurance with a deductible of at least $1200 
for individuals and $2400 for families, where the combined cost of the insurance and the 
deductible does not exceed $5950 for individuals and $11,900 for families. See I.R.C. § 
223(c)(2), (g); EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, supra note 64, at 15. 
  Unlike MSAs, these accounts permit contributions from both employees and 
employers in the same year. See HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED 
HEALTH PLANS, I.R.S. Pub. 969 (Jan 14, 2011), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p969.pdf. 
 73. See I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)–(3), (g). EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS,  
supra note 64, at 15; HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH 
PLANS, supra note 72, at 5. 
 74. See I.R.C. § 223(c)(1); EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, supra note 
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Contributions are deducted above the line75 and are also exempt 
from payroll taxes if the HSA is part of a cafeteria plan.76 Income 
earned within HSAs is also tax exempt.77 
HSAs are explicitly excluded from the deferred compensation 
limitations found in I.R.C. § 125,78 and unused funds at year-end are 
rolled over to the next year.79 If amounts contributed to an HSA are 
spent for non-eligible expenses, those amounts must be included in 
income and are subjected to a 20% penalty tax.80 When an HSA 
owner dies, the HSA continues if his spouse is the beneficiary.81 If 
another person acquires the account, the money must be distributed 
and included in income. However, the 20% penalty is not assessed.82 
The penalty is also not assessed after an HSA owner reaches 65, 
regardless of what he spends the money on.83 Thus, HSAs provide a 
tax-deferred savings vehicle, similar to a traditional Individual 
Retirement Account or 401(k) plan, for taxpayers lucky enough to 
reach retirement or who die without needing the money contributed 
to an HSA.84 
The hope was that making MSA-type accounts permanent would 
spur the market for high deductible plans, further increasing the 
incentive for individual taxpayers to save for their medical needs 
while acting to slow the growth of medical costs. However, to date, 
the use of HSAs within plans remains below expectations. According 
to one study, in 2005 only 2% of employers offered such plans.85 
While the percentage jumped to 6% in 2006, even this number is 
substantially below target.86 To the extent that the goal was to 
 
64, at 15. 
 75. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 223(a). 
 76. See EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, supra note 64, at 15. 
 77. See I.R.C. § 223(e). 
 78. See id. § 125(d)(2)(D) (2006). 
 79. See id. § 223(d)(1)(E). 
 80. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(2)–(4) (West 2010). Prior to 2010, the tax penalty was 10%. See 
I.R.C. § 223(f)(4). 
 81. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(8)(A). 
 82. See id. § 223(f)(4)(B), (8)(B). 
 83. See id. § 223(f)(4)(C); Social Security Act § 1811, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006). 
 84. This problem could readily be solved by requiring that unused amounts in HSAs be 
donated to charity upon the death of the beneficial owner. 
 85. See CATHERINE HOFFMAN & JENNIFER TOLBERT, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
AND HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS: ARE THEY AN OPTION FOR LOW-INCOME 
FAMILIES? 7 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7568.pdf. 
 86. See id. 
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encourage low-income uninsured people to obtain insurance, the 
plan has also been a disappointment; users tend to be higher-income 
individuals.87 In addition, one study of the program from 2005 to 
2007 showed that between 42% and 49% of people who had a high 
deductible plan failed to open an HSA, suggesting that the tax 
incentive is unnecessary for those participants or that they simply do 
not have funds available to contribute.88 
In addition, while high-deductible medical insurance plans may 
make economic sense for the healthy, the chronically ill will almost 
certainly spend through their deductible each year, eating up any 
possible savings that might be associated with such plans.89 
Accordingly, the plans are far more attractive to some than others, 
skewing the risk pools.90 Finally, the institutions that offer HSAs 
often charge significant annual fees that can eat up a portion of the 
amounts set aside. Set-up charges can be as high as $20, with 
monthly fees of up to $3, for an annual total of $36.91 It would be 
an understatement to say that this approach to health care cost 
management is controversial.92 
E. Analysis of Health Care Provisions 
The patchwork of tax provisions described above is both 
incoherent and ineffective. The I.R.C. § 213 deduction sets a floor 
below which medical spending is not deductible, presumably based 
upon the theory that no deduction is warranted unless taxpayers 
incur extraordinary expenses. Yet, the exclusion from income of 
employer-provided healthcare is the functional equivalent of allowing 
taxpayers to deduct the first dollar of medical expenses, at least if 
 
 87. See HSA Participation Up, Mostly Among Higher-Income Earners, 2008 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 95–5 (May 15, 2008). 
 88. See id. 
 89. HOFFMAN & TOLBERT, supra note 85, at 4. 
 90. See id. at 6. 
 91. See Michelle Andrews, The Promise and the Pitfalls of Health Savings Accounts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at B6; see also I.R.S. Notice 08–59, 2008–29 I.R.B. 123 (describing 
how fees are to be accounted for). 
 92. See, e.g., Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and Consumer Driven Health Care: Cost 
Containment or Cost Shift?: Hearing on H.R. 5917 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 94–95 (2008) (written Statement of Gail Shearer, 
Director, Health Policy Analysis, Washington Office, Consumers Union), available at  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg50037/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg50037.pdf; 
id. at 32–38 (statement of Linda J. Blumberg, Ph.D., Principal Research Associate, The Urban 
Institute). 
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taxpayers do not incur any uninsured expenses. Similarly, the 
exclusion of FSA and HSA contributions provides the functional 
equivalent of a deduction for the first dollar spent on healthcare, 
thus overriding I.R.C. § 213’s policy of disallowing deductions 
below a floor. 
Despite the subsidies for employer-provided insurance, the 
number of uninsured people in the United States stands at 
approximately fifty million.93 Both FSAs and HSAs have failed to live 
up to their promise, as a surprisingly low number of those eligible to 
participate actually do. Moreover, these provisions may work at 
cross-purposes. A subsidy for health insurance makes buying 
insurance more attractive because it lowers the cost. However, the 
ability to exclude amounts contributed to FSAs and HSAs from 
income lowers the cost of being uninsured, reducing the incentive to 
acquire insurance. If health care policy is conceived of as a jet plane 
and these provisions its engines, it appears that Congress has pointed 
the engines in different directions.94 
The recent effort at federal health care reform and the current 
effort to undo it reveal that it is extremely difficult in the current 
environment to address all of these issues on a global basis. 
Accordingly, I focus here on one piece of the puzzle—the FSA. 
While this provision is far smaller in dollar terms than the exclusion 
for traditional health insurance, it causes significant taxpayer 
aggravation, which cannot help but affect the way in which taxpayers 
view the income tax as a whole. However, before considering how 
best to improve FSAs, I turn first to discuss the charitable deduction, 
another tax expenditure that many see as underperforming. 
III. THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
The Code has allowed a deduction for charitable donations since 
1917.95 Nonetheless, the rationale for the deduction is not entirely 
 
93. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 23. 
 94. See Kleinbard, supra note 10, at 17 n.61 (noting that Congress, unlike aerospace 
engineers, cannot always be trusted to point the engines in the same direction). 
 95. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330. An effort to 
have a similar provision included in the original 1913 Act was unsuccessful. See J.S. SEIDMAN, 
SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938–1861, at 945 
(1938). For a discussion of the history of the charitable donation, see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, 
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2001). 
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clear.96 The legislative history suggests that a key reason for enacting 
it was a fear that wealthy individuals would not otherwise donate to 
institutions of higher education, which had come to depend on 
donations for their survival.97 However, the charitable deduction was 
not limited to this ostensible purpose; deductions were allowed for 
donations to all types of charitable organizations. The Code 
provisions related to charitable deductions have been amended 
numerous times over the past ninety years, further clouding the 
legislative history.98 
Scholars have offered two basic justifications for a broad 
charitable deduction. As with the health care provisions, some argue 
that the charitable deduction is appropriate on income definition 
grounds because amounts given to charity do not constitute income 
in a theoretical sense and therefore should be excluded from the tax 
base.99 Others argue that charity should be subsidized, and that the 
deduction serves as an indirect subsidy to charity because it 
encourages people to donate. As the subsidy theory predominates, I 
focus on that here. 
Justifications for a subsidy for charity are many, but they 
generally fall into two categories. The first is that “subsidizing 
charities is necessary to assist them in providing public goods that 
would otherwise be under-produced due to market and 
 
 96. See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 
547 (2006) (describing the theories of the charitable deduction as “underdetermined” and 
“undertheorized”). 
 97. See 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917). 
  98. See generally Aprill, supra note 95. 
 99. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 9, at 313; see also, Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffery H. 
Kahn, “Gifts Gafts and Geft”—The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and 
Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 461 (2003). For a contrary view see Kelman, supra note 9, at 
849; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation 
of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1992) (arguing that charitable giving contains an 
element of personal consumption). 
  For additional theories of why a deduction should be allowed for charitable giving, 
see Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. 
REV. 37, 58–59 (1972) (arguing for a deduction for charitable giving because such giving 
reduces a taxpayer’s well-being or ability to pay, for which income is really a proxy); Alvin 
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1088 
(1980) (arguing that the sum of individual incomes should equal societal income and 
concluding that charitable giving does not increase societal income, thus warranting a 
deduction so long as the recipient includes the gift in income). 
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governmental failures.”100 The second is that subsidizing charitable 
giving reinforces democratic and other values,101 or otherwise 
increases general welfare.102 Regardless of the justification offered, 
the underlying contention of these different theories is that society 
gains more from the subsidy, whether economically or in other 
intangible ways, than it costs to provide the subsidy. 
Accepting, arguendo, that the government should subsidize 
charity, the question that arises is how best to do it. Options range 
from direct subsidies, where the government issues grants to 
charitable organizations, to indirect subsidies, where the government 
creates incentives for others to do so. If the justification for 
government support of private charity rests on the notion that 
government is incapable of producing the appropriate mix or level of 
public goods, direct subsidies controlled by the government make 
little sense because the government is likely to repeat its mistakes in 
making direct grants to charitable organizations.103 Instead, it makes 
 
 100. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 165, 183 (2008). Theorists have articulated several reasons why government 
would subsidize nongovernmental actors in its quest to provide public goods rather than 
provide those goods itself. Where demand is heterogeneous, it will be almost impossible for 
the government to determine the precise mix and level of goods that will maximize welfare. 
Charities are likely to be far more efficient than the government, and they can serve as 
laboratories for ideas, much as the states purportedly do in our federal system. In addition, 
government may not be able to provide the goods because of constitutional or other limits. 
For an in-depth discussion of these reasons, see Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable 
Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1988). 
 101. See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond 
Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1 (2006) 
(arguing that private charity promotes diversity); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 387, 405–06 (1998) (noting that tax subsidies for charities may help a portion of citizens 
become more involved individually with charities than they would without a tax subsidy). But 
see Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for 
the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 390–91 (1972) (noting that even though the 
author is generally supportive of subsidized charity, the pluralistic benefits from the subsidy 
may be overstated).  
 102. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 508 & n.7 (2010) (arguing that charity 
enhances welfare through wealth redistribution); Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the 
Charitable Deduction to Legislate Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and 
Individual Humanity Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 304–
306 (2010) (citing evidence that charitable giving is beneficial for both the donor and 
recipient). 
 103. One way to retain a direct subsidy while discerning and honoring taxpayer 
preferences would be through direct matching grants to charities. At the end of each year, 
charities could provide lists of donors and amounts received. The government could then issue 
grants to those charities proportional to donations received. For a debate on this approach, 
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far more sense to allow individuals to choose where their public 
good dollars are spent. This is where the Code comes in. 
The Code provides two possible methods for providing indirect 
subsidies to taxpayers. The first method is to allow taxpayers to 
exclude or deduct amounts donated to charity.104 The second 
method is to award tax credits to taxpayers for the same activity. 
Under a deduction model, a taxpayer who gives away income 
deducts the same amount, thus lowering his income and reducing his 
tax liability by his marginal rate.105 The subsidy rate implicit in this 
approach is equal to the taxpayer’s marginal rate. As a result, those in 
higher tax brackets receive a higher subsidy than those in lower tax 
brackets.106 Moreover, setting the subsidy at the taxpayer’s marginal 
rate yields a result equivalent to what would happen if the taxpayer 
had never earned the amounts given away and possibly reflects 
ambivalence as to the deduction’s proper justification. 
Under a credit approach, taxpayers determine their income and 
tax liability without regard to their donations. Instead, they receive a 
tax credit for their donation that directly reduces the amount of tax 
owed.107 Unlike the deduction approach, it is necessary to set the 
amount of the subsidy explicitly. Moreover, absent express provisions 
that phase the subsidy in or out depending on income levels, all 
taxpayers receive the same amount of subsidy, thus avoiding the 
upside down subsidy problem implicit in a deduction approach. 
While Congress has increased its use of tax credits in recent years, the 
 
compare McDaniel, supra note 101 (advocating the use of a matching grant program instead 
of the current subsidy regime), with Bittker, supra note 99 (explaining why matching grant 
programs could not pass constitutional or practical concerns and are therefore unworkable). 
While this approach is used in England, it has never been seriously considered in U.S. political 
circles. For a discussion of how the English system, called Gift Aid, works, see Gift Aid—
Information for Charities, DIRECTGOV, http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/ 
MoneyTaxAndBenefits/ManagingMoney/GivingMoneyToCharity/DG_10015097 (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2011). 
 104. While some have called for allowing a deduction or credit for donated time, see 
Thomas, supra note 102, at 271, Congress to date has refrained from so doing. Accordingly, I 
will focus here only on donations of money or property. 
 105. From an income tax perspective, this approach yields a result consistent with 
excluding amounts donated to charity from income. However, this does not take payroll taxes 
into account. Amounts excluded from income are also exempt from payroll taxes. Amounts 
deducted from income remain subject to the payroll tax. As discussed more fully below, this 
can be a significant difference. 
 106. See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 5, at 134–38. 
 107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2011) (allowing a dollar-for-dollar 
credit for contributions to school tuition organizations). 
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deduction remains the primary means of handling charitable 
donations in the federal tax system. 
However, Congress has imposed a number of limits on the 
ability to deduct charitable donations that significantly affect the 
incentive to give. For instance, taxpayers may deduct the entire 
amount of any cash donations. In contrast, Congress has limited the 
deduction for most property donations to a taxpayer’s basis in the 
property donated,108 yielding a result equivalent to what would occur 
if the income had never been earned.  
Congress has also limited the total amount that may be deducted 
in any given year.109 Under current law, taxpayers may deduct 
charitable donations up to a maximum of fifty percent of income,110 
though Congress has made a number of exceptions to this rule to 
encourage giving.111 Taxpayers are allowed to carry over excess 
amounts into subsequent tax years for five years, so, except for those 
 
 108. See I.R.C. § 170(e) (2006). Congress has created several exceptions to this rule. For 
instance, where the use of the donation by the recipient is related to the basis for the 
recipient’s tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501, a donor may deduct the full fair market value. 
See id. at § 170(e)(1). Allowing some taxpayers to deduct the full fair market value of 
appreciated property raises equity concerns, see, e.g., Halperin, supra note 6, at 1–4, and allows 
taxpayers to deduct amounts never included in income, a clear violation of tax logic. However, 
if the goal is to provide a subsidy, there is simply no reason why the level of the subsidy should 
be so limited. Instead, the question should be whether the subsidy level is justified by the net 
benefit to society. 
 109. Limits may serve many purposes. They may blunt the upside down nature of the 
subsidy and help preserve the progressivity found in the Code; to the extent that the wealthy 
donate to different charities than the poor, they could affect the mix of charities receiving 
donations; and they could also act as a crude Alternative Minimum Tax, ensuring that all 
taxpayers pay something even when availing themselves of legitimate tax preferences. See 
Fleischer, supra note 100, at 192–93, 196, 202. We could also conceive of the decision to 
allow a deduction as a compromise between the majority voters who set the government’s 
agenda (the classic majority) and a second majority (the new majority), comprised of minority 
groups who have different preferences but cannot coalesce around one that outstrips the classic 
majority. Limits allow the new majority to direct the use of some, but not all, of their tax 
money. See id. at 207–10. 
 110. I.R.C. § 170(b). The Code actually refers to “contribution base,” which is a 
modified version of AGI. This limit has changed numerous times over the past ninety years, 
always trending ever higher from the original fifteen percent of “net taxable income.” For a 
brief history of how the limits have changed, see Fleischer, supra note 100, at 170–73. 
 111. If the donor of a conservation easement is a qualified farmer or rancher, the 
maximum amount of the donation rises from 50% to 100% of income. I.R.C. § 170(b)(E). 
Some provisions are temporary. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, Congress lifted the 
limits on charitable contributions in cash made between August 28, 2005 and December 31, 
2005. See Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016, 
2022–23 (2005). 
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who have little income, this provision mostly affects timing.112 
Congress has also tinkered with the limit by allowing some taxpayers 
to exclude certain amounts donated from income.113 
Congress has also experimented with the subsidy by changing 
the timing for charitable deductions. Normally, deductions are taken 
in the tax year in which donations are made.114 However, in response 
to natural disasters, in some years Congress has allowed donors to 
take deductions against a previous year’s income.115 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Congress has significantly 
limited the charitable deduction’s incentive effect by placing it below 
the line, where it is not considered when calculating AGI. AGI is a 
preliminary measure of net income used to determine which 
taxpayers are eligible for certain provisions. Initially, above-the-line 
deductions differed in type from those that fell below the line, with 
below-the-line deductions more likely to be tax preferences or other 
 
 112. There is no way to know what effect the limit has on donation decisions, but 
statistics from 2008 reveal that approximately 440,000 returns claimed a carryover amount. See 
STATISTICS OF INCOME—2008 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, I.R.S. Pub. 1304 (July 
2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08inalcr.pdf. It is not possible to know 
how many people refrained from donating because of the limits. 
 113. For instance, those who win certain types of prizes, such as the Nobel Prize, may 
exclude them from income so long as they donate their winnings to a charitable organization. 
See I.R.C. § 74(b). Similarly, a recent provision permits those ages 70 ½ and older who donate 
their IRAs to charity to exclude up to $100,000 of the donated amounts from income. See id. 
at § 408(d)(8). Originally set to expire on December 31, 2007, this provision was extended to 
December 31, 2009 by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-343, §205(a), 122 Stat. 3765, 3865 (2008); see also I.R.S. Notice 07-7, 
2007-1 C.B. 395. 
 114. See I.R.C. § 170(a). Different rules apply to accrual method corporations. However, 
the bulk of American charity is from individuals. See Press Release, Giving USA Foundation, 
U.S. Charitable Giving Falls 3.6% in 2009 to $303.75 Billion (June 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.givingusa.org/press_releases/gusa/gusa060910.pdf (reporting that individuals 
gave $227.41 billion to charities in 2009). 
 115. In response to the massive earthquake that occurred in the Andaman Sea on 
December 26, 2004, causing a massive tsunami that wiped out entire villages and killed an 
estimated 230,000 people, Congress allowed people to deduct in the 2004 tax year donations 
made through January 31 of 2005. See Act of Jan. 7, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-1, 119 Stat. 3. 
More recently, in response to the massive earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, 
killing approximately 220,000, Congress allowed cash donations to benefit the Haiti 
earthquake survivors to be deducted against 2009 income, so long as they were made between 
January 12, 2010 and March 1, 2010. See Act of Jan. 22, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-126, 124 
Stat. 3; see also I.R.S. Notice 1396 (Jan. 2010), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/n1396.pdf. 
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expenditures that were not considered essential when calculating 
relative incomes. This distinction has broken down over time.116 
However, with the introduction of the standard deduction in 
1944, placement above or below the line took on additional 
significance. Those who took the standard deduction were not 
allowed to take below-the-line deductions as well,117 thus blunting 
any incentives associated with the now displaced deductions. Several 
members of Congress argued for moving the charitable deduction 
above the line to keep the incentives for giving in place.118 
Ultimately, they were outvoted by those who believed that those in 
the lower income brackets would give regardless of the tax incentive, 
that simplification gains were worth the loss of the incentive, or that 
no separate deduction was needed because the standard deduction 
was set at a level that included presumed charitable donations.119 
Finally, as part of the 1986 reforms, Congress added I.R.C. § 68 
to the Code, which limits the amount of itemized deductions 
taxpayers whose AGI exceeds a certain threshold may take.120 As a 
result, even those who itemize may not get the full benefit of their 
charitable deductions, regardless of whether they are below the 50% 
annual limit on total deductions.121 
For those who believe that the charitable deduction is required as 
a matter of income measurement,122 the current design is faulty 
because the significant restrictions on deductibility yield an incorrect 
measure of income. For those who believe the deduction is a tax 
incentive, it is poorly designed because the incentive is limited to a 
small number of taxpayers.123 In either case, the fix may be similar: 
making the deduction available to more taxpayers. 
 
 116. For a discussion of the above- and below-the-line distinction and how it has 
changed over time, see Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for 
Structural Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 117. See I.R.C. §§ 62–63 (2006). 
 118. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 850–51. 
 119. See id. at 851–52. 
 120. As currently structured, the threshold amount disappears in 2010 only to reappear 
in 2011. See Rev. Proc. 09-50, § 2.06, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617. The threshold for 2009 was 
$166,800. See Rev. Proc. 08-66, § 3.11, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107. 
 121. Unlike I.R.C. § 170, which permits taxpayers to carryover amounts above the limits, 
I.R.C. § 68 contains no carryover provision, so any amounts disallowed are lost for good. 
 122. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 9. 
 123. As described below, some argue that the incentive is not underperforming because 
those who receive no incentive would nonetheless give to charity. See discussion infra Part V. 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1066 
IV. EFFORTS TO REFORM FSA PROVISIONS AND THE CHARITABLE 
DEDUCTION 
Over the years, numerous efforts have been undertaken to 
reform both the FSA provisions and the charitable deduction. To 
date, none have succeeded. This Part describes those proposals and 
efforts. 
A. FSAs 
As noted above in Part II, FSAs suffer from two main problems. 
First, they are available only to those whose employers offer them, or 
approximately thirty-nine percent of the workforce.124 Second, a 
shockingly low number of people eligible to participate actually do 
so. A wide range of possible solutions exist. Thus, before turning to 
the actual attempts to reform FSAs, I first canvass these possible 
solutions and the policy implications they present. 
There seems to be no principled reason why this tax benefit—not 
to mention the exclusion for health insurance generally—is tied to 
employment. Congress could easily change this. For instance, as with 
IRAs, Congress could allow all taxpayers to open FSAs with financial 
institutions and to contribute directly to their accounts. In all other 
respects, the plans could work the way they do now. Taxpayers 
would deduct amounts contributed to such accounts on their 
returns, just as they do now for IRA contributions.125 While non-
work-based plans would not partake of the feature that permits 
automatic withdrawal from one’s paycheck, and therefore automatic 
exclusion for tax purposes, such a plan would be fairer than the 
current rule because all taxpayers could participate. 
Expanding FSAs in this manner could be done without altering 
the characterization of such plans as insurance under I.R.C. § 
106(c)(2) or altering the rule in I.R.C. § 125(d) precluding deferred 
compensation. Indeed, removing FSAs from the employment 
context and therefore out from under I.R.C. § 125 would open the 
 
 124. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 56. 
 125. One difficulty is that allowing a deduction for amounts contributed to a healthcare 
FSA would not account for payroll taxes withheld or paid by the employer. Withheld taxes 
could be addressed through the return-filing system quite easily. Accounting for employer-paid 
taxes is more difficult. Also, assuming that the irrevocable election requirement were retained, 
some enforcement mechanism would need to be developed to deal with taxpayers who 
committed to contribute to FSAs yet failed to do so. 
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way to allowing rollovers on an administrative basis because the 
statutory bar to deferred compensation would no longer apply. The 
only question would be whether returning unused premiums or 
allowing them to be applied to the next year would be consistent 
with the characterization of FSAs as insurance. While this might not 
be wise as a business policy, there is nothing in the nature of 
insurance that precludes such behavior. Severing the link between 
employment and FSAs would also cloud the picture of risk for the 
purported insurer because contributions would not stop when the 
taxpayer left his or her job. However, the regulations make clear that 
these plans must resemble insurance, not match commercially 
available insurance in every respect. Thus, the Treasury Department 
could require that unused premiums be returned or rolled over to 
the next year. 
An argument could also readily be made that FSAs and the other 
provisions that subsidize health care costs should be eliminated. 
Excluding insurance from the tax base increases demand, which can 
increase price.126 Insurance also contributes to rising medical costs 
because insured persons do not directly bear the costs and so are 
more likely to engage in riskier behavior and seek medical care they 
otherwise would not. Allowing taxpayers to exclude from income 
amounts spent out-of-pocket on healthcare also distorts the decision 
to buy insurance by making it less expensive to be uninsured.127 
During the 2008 presidential race and the debates over healthcare 
reform, there was significant discussion of revoking these 
provisions.128 However, Congress decided to leave the current 
structure largely intact. 
 
 126. See Laura E. Cunningham, National Health Insurance and the Medical Deduction, 
50 TAX L. REV. 237, 238, 249 n.57 (1995); Joseph Bankman, John Cogan, R. Glenn 
Hubbard & Daniel Kessler, Draft: Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health 
Insurance, Presentation at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy 
and Public Finance 4–7 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ 
ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__tax_policy/documents
/documents/ecm_pro_067719.pdf. If good health is a public good, where the beneficiaries 
fail to capture all the benefits, the market may undersupply the good from a societal 
perspective, and subsidies may be warranted. This is an empirical question that is far beyond 
the scope of this article, but many believe this to be unlikely. 
 127. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and 
Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1485 (1991) (arguing that the most efficient system would be to tax the receipt of health 
insurance and to deny a deduction of medical costs). 
 128. See, e.g., Greg D’Angelo & Robert Moffit, Health Care Reform: Changing the Tax 
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A number of reasons may warrant eliminating FSAs on a stand-
alone basis. For instance, FSAs appear to be most effective for those 
who have predictable expenses.129 There seems to be little reason to 
afford such people a special tax benefit. FSAs may also contribute to 
changes in the private insurance markets that require insured people 
to shoulder more of the burden of their own healthcare costs.130 
While this might be beneficial from a cost containment perspective, 
it may unduly burden those who cannot afford to pay more than 
they currently do. In addition, one study suggests that the tax 
benefits of FSAs are offset by corresponding increases in out-of-
pocket expenditures on an individual basis. When the costs of 
allowing the tax benefit are factored in, FSAs likely decrease 
welfare.131 
FSAs functionally allow taxpayers to deduct medical expenses 
beginning with the first dollar spent, thereby conflicting with the 
policy implicit in I.R.C. § 213, which sets a floor. HSAs accomplish 
many of the same goals as FSAs, but without many of the 
cumbersome rules. They also create an incentive to purchase high 
deductible insurance, which is arguably good because it creates 
incentives for people to monitor their spending. As a result, FSAs 
may no longer be necessary. Finally, the rules implemented to make 
FSAs look like insurance frustrate taxpayers, causing them to spend 
significant time trying to estimate their otherwise uninsured medical 
expenses, to fail to sign up for or underfund accounts, and to race 
out to spend money on unnecessary items or procedures to avoid 
forfeiture. Simply put, the game may not be worth the candle. 
 
Treatment of Health Insurance (Webmemo #2344), THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 16, 
2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/03/health-care-reform-changing-
the-tax-treatment-of-health-insurance; Jeff Liebman, Senator McCain’s New Tax on Health 
Insurance, TPMCAFÉ (Oct. 6, 2008, 10:28 AM), http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/ 
2008/10/06/senator_mccains_new_tax_on_hea/ (describing McCain’s proposal to tax 
employer-provided health insurance benefits while giving all taxpayers a $5000 tax credit to be 
used to buy insurance). 
 129. See James H. Cardon & Mark H. Showalter, An Examination of Flexible Spending 
Accounts, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 935, 936 (2001). 
 130. See id. at 953; William Jack, Arik Levinson & Sjamsu Rahardja, Employee Cost-
Sharing and the Welfare Effects of Flexible Spending Accounts, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 2285, 2300 
(2006). 
 131. See Jack et al., supra note 130, at 2300. But see James H. Cardon, Flexible Spending 
Accounts and Adverse Selection, 77 J. RISK & INS. 145, 146 (2010) (suggesting that health care 
FSAs may improve pooling for insurance purposes in a way that leaves both low and high risk 
taxpayers better off). 
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One could also argue for a change to I.R.C. § 213 to allow 
taxpayers to deduct the first dollar of medical expenses, thus 
rendering FSAs unnecessary. However, such a deduction would 
function as a type of free insurance that distorts the market for 
insurance by reducing demand.132 That said, reducing the demand 
for insurance could significantly reduce medical expenditures, thus 
warranting a deduction for all medical expenditures.133 Indeed, given 
that we currently distort the market for insurance by allowing it to be 
provided tax-free in the employment setting, excluding amounts 
spent on healthcare may actually enhance efficiency by acting as a 
countermeasure, at least to the extent it is available to those who get 
their healthcare tax free.134  
Another proposal would allow a deduction for expected health 
care costs, which could be calculated based on the insurance policy 
purchased.135 If one’s actual healthcare costs were less than the 
expected costs, the taxpayer would get a deduction for amounts not 
spent. Conversely, if one spent more than anticipated, no deduction 
would be allowed for the excess expenditure. The thought here is 
that such a deduction would counteract the tax benefit offered for 
employer-provided insurance, while creating a stronger incentive to 
monitor health care costs than would an allowance for actual 
expenditures.136 
FSAs offer three advantages over simply allowing taxpayers to 
deduct their actual or expected medical expenses. First, a third party 
verifies the validity of the expenses before reimbursing taxpayers, 
decreasing the likelihood of cheating.137 Second, the FSAs require ex 
ante savings. Third, amounts contributed to FSAs are exempt from 
income and payroll taxes. Section 213 of the Code only allows a 
deduction against income. As a result, taxpayers are better off 
 
 132. See Kaplow, supra note 127. 
 133. See Bankman et al., supra note 126. 
 134. See JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, 
WEALTHY AND WISE: 5 STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM ( 2d ed. 2011). Of course, 
if health insurance is a public good, it is likely undersubscribed because those paying for health 
insurance do not reap all the benefits, thus justifying a subsidy on efficiency grounds. In such a 
case, a countervailing subsidy would be ill-advised. 
 135. See Bankman et al., supra note 126. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Of course, numerous other deductions are available simply by listing the 
expenditures on one’s return. It is not clear why these types of deductions should be treated 
differently. 
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excluding income than deducting it. One could amend I.R.C. § 213 
to allow an extra deduction to account for payroll taxes to level the 
field, but it is not clear how one would handle the employer-paid 
portion of those taxes. 
To date, there have been no legislative or administrative efforts 
either to broaden the availability of FSAs beyond the employment 
context or to eliminate them. Instead, legislators and administrators 
have attempted to tinker around the edges. For instance, to combat 
the problems arising from the use-it-or-lose-it rule, legislators have 
introduced eight different bills to allow taxpayers to roll over unused 
amounts in their FSAs at year-end. Some have passed the House, 
but, so far none has made it all the way through the legislative 
process.138 
In 2003, the Treasury Department administratively broadened 
the appeal of FSAs by treating over-the-counter medications as 
eligible expenses.139 In late 2004, apparently frustrated by the lack of 
legislative action on the question of rollovers, Senator Charles 
Grassley, then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, wrote a 
letter to the Treasury Department asking whether it could 
administratively allow rollovers.140 The Treasury Department took 
 
 138. In 2001, Representative Ed Royce, along with seven cosponsors introduced a bill 
that would do just this, but the bill died in committee. See H.R. 167, 107th Cong. (2001). 
Later that year, he introduced another bill, this time with eleven cosponsors, to the same effect 
and with the same result. See H.R. 3105, 107th Cong. (2001). In 2003, he tried again, 
garnering twelve cosponsors. See H.R. 176, 108th Cong. (2003). Later that year, Jim DeMint 
introduced a bill that allowed carryovers, but limited the amount to $500. This bill garnered 
seventy-three cosponsors. Still later that year, Bill Thomas introduced a bill that mainly 
addressed Health Savings Accounts. See H.R. 2351, 108th Cong. (2003). During the markup 
of this bill, the language suggested by Rep. DeMint was added in. Eventually, a form of this 
legislation was included in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003. Unfortunately for proponents of carryovers, this language was dropped from the 
final version. See Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
  In 2004, Rep. Royce again introduced his bill to allow carryovers, this time 
garnering only four cosponsors. See H.R. 4007, 108th Cong. (2004). A similar bill, see H.R. 
4279, 108th Cong. (2004), was introduced later that year with 16 cosponsors. It found itself 
attached to another piece of legislation, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost Timely 
HealthCare Act of 2004. H.R. 4280, 4281, 108th Cong (2004). While the combined bills 
passed the House, the Senate did not act on them. In 2005, Royce again introduced his bill to 
allow unlimited carryovers. See H.R. 1805, 109th Cong. (2005). He also introduced bills in 
2007 (no cosponsors), see H.R. 3306, 110th Cong. (2007) and 2009 (one cosponsor), see 
H.R. 544, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 139. See Rev. Rul. 03–102, 2003-2 C.B. 559. 
 140. See Treasury Thanks Pension Group for Letter on FSA Restrictions, 2006 TAX NOTES 
TODAY, 124–31 (June 22, 2006). 
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the position that allowing a rollover would violate the rule found in 
I.R.C. § 125 prohibiting deferred compensation and argued that 
Congress had effectively ratified its construction of the statute.141 
Thus, any efforts to fix this rule would need to come from the 
legislature. Nonetheless, in mid-2005, reasoning that a limited 
rollover would not implicate the restriction contained in I.R.C. § 
125, the IRS allowed taxpayers a 2.5 month grace period for 
incurring medical costs beyond the end of a year, provided their 
plans allow it.142 
As part of the Patient Protection Act, Congress took two steps to 
cut back on FSAs. First, reimbursement for over-the-counter 
medications will no longer be allowed as of 2011.143 Second, the 
maximum amount contributable to an FSA will be set at $2,500 for 
2013, with the total amount adjusting thereafter based on 
inflation.144 Despite these moves, it is not at all clear that FSAs are 
currently disfavored. Congress could easily have eliminated the plans 
had it seen fit to do so. Moreover, the upcoming limit far exceeds 
the average contributions to such plans,145 so it is unclear what effect 
this restriction will have. 
B. The Charitable Deduction 
When Congress created the standard deduction it was fully aware 
that those who chose it would lose the tax incentive to give to 
charity. There was significant concern for the financial welfare of 
charities; however, those in favor of the proposal reasoned either that 
the gain in simplicity was worth the cost or that nonitemizers were 
likely to give regardless of whether they received a deduction. 
Moreover, because an amount for presumed charitable donations 
would be included in the standard deduction itself, nonitemizers 
 
 141. See id. The Treasury addressed neither the purported insurance nature of such 
contracts nor the notion that allowing rollovers would weaken the argument that healthcare 
FSAs were really a form of insurance. 
 142. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,941 (Aug. 6, 2007); 
I.R.S. Notice 05-42, 2005-1 C.B. 1204. 
 143. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
9003, 124 Stat. 119, 868 (2010). 
 144. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 125(i) (West 2011) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 
1403(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1063 (2010)). 
 145. See MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, supra note 56; see also INT’L FOUND. OF 
EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 5. 
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were being treated on par with itemizers, thus defeating any equity 
argument.146 
Despite losing the debate in 1944, those in favor of a charitable 
deduction for all taxpayers continued to push to move the deduction 
above the line. They briefly succeeded between 1982 and 1986, until 
Congress reinstated the deduction below the line as part of a major 
overhaul of the tax system.147 Since then, the push to move the 
deduction back above the line has continued unabated. Both 
scholars148 and politicians149 have argued for changing the law, citing 
both incentive and fairness concerns.150 Some proposals call for 
allowing all charitable deductions above the line, while retaining a 
sizeable standard deduction.151 Other proposals are more 
complicated, employing floors or ceilings on the amount deductible 
above the line.152 
 
 146. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 850–52. 
 147. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 172, 196 
(1981). For 1982 and 1983, individuals were allowed to deduct 25% of the first $100 of 
charitable donations, or $25, above the line. For 1984, the cap increased to $300, for a 
maximum $75 above-the-line deduction. For 1985, individuals were allowed to deduct 50% of 
their charitable donations with no cap. In 1986, the amount deductible above the line was 
increased to 100%. The provision expired at the end of 1986. 
 148. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the 
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 611 (2009) (arguing for an above-the-line 
deduction for all charitable contributions); Joseph Cordes et al., Extending the Charitable 
Deduction to Nonitemizers: Policy Issues and Options,  7 URB. INST.’S CHARTING CIV. SOC’Y 
1, 3 (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT], available at 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310338 (modeling several possibilities). 
 149. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 854 (describing, among other proposals, President 
Clinton’s 2001 proposal to allow 50% of deductions above a certain floor to be taken above 
the line and President Bush’s 2001 proposal to allow the charitable deduction to 
nonitemizers); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET 
PROPOSAL (JOINT COMM. PRINT JCS-3-04 No (I.R.S.)). 
 150. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 854–56. 
 151. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 148, at 611. 
 152. For instance, one proposal called for 100% of all charitable deductions to be allowed 
above the line up to the amount of the standard deduction. See Charitable Giving Tax Relief 
Act, H.R. 777, 107th Cong. (2001). Another called for nonitemizers to be allowed to deduct 
contributions in excess of $1000 ($2000 if filing jointly). See Giving Incentive and Volunteer 
Empowerment (GIVE) Act, H.R. 1338, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill would also have 
allowed taxpayers to deduct 120% of the amount donated, thus increasing the subsidy beyond 
the tax that would have been owed absent the donation. Thus, taxpayers would be better off 
from an income tax perspective earning money and giving it away than they would have been 
by not earning it in the first place. Another called for allowing a deduction for cash 
contributions to charity to the extent such contributions exceeded $500, but not to exceed 
$1000 for joint returns. See Charitable Giving Act, H.R. 7, 108th Cong. (2003). Still another 
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A 2000 Urban Institute study modeled four different 
possibilities, including (1) allowing deductions of all charitable 
donations above the line, (2) allowing itemizers to deduct donations 
above the line in excess of $500, (3) allowing all taxpayers to deduct 
contributions above the line in excess of $500, and (4) allowing all 
taxpayers to deduct donations in excess of a revenue neutral floor.153 
Assuming that these proposals had been fully in place in 1995, the 
study attempted to predict increased giving and potential revenue 
losses. It concluded that, under certain assumptions, the anticipated 
increase in giving outweighed the cost.154 
A 2002 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report also 
considered a number of different proposals to move charitable 
deductions above the line.155 Starting with two Bush-era proposals—
a proposal to phase in above-the-line deductions for all donations 
and another to phase in a deduction of up to $500 ($1000 if filing 
jointly) above the line—the CBO noted that the Treasury and Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated costs ranging from $52.1 
to $84.4 billion for the former and $29.3 to $32.6 billion for the 
latter, while predicting that giving would likely increase no more 
than 4%, or approximately $4.8 billion.156 
 
called for an above-the-line deduction for all charitable contributions in excess of $2000 (for 
those filing jointly) for five years, with the floor reducing to $1000 after the five-year period. 
See Treasury Explains Clinton Budget Revenue Proposals, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 27–26 (Feb. 
9, 2000). In yet another proposal, nonitemizing taxpayers would have been allowed to deduct 
$100 ($200 if filing jointly) above the line, with the total amount increasing to $500 ($1000 if 
filing jointly). See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2003 REVENUE PROPOSALS 2 (2002). 
 153. These amounts are for those filing jointly. The floors for those filing singly are half 
as much. See Cordes et al., supra note 148. For purposes of the report, the authors assumed 
1995 income levels. 
 154. In situations where this is not the case, it would make far more sense for the 
government to make direct grants to charity. For instance, if the government were to collect 
$100 million less in revenue but spur only $80 million in additional giving, the government 
would be better served by giving $80 million to charity, thus saving $20 million. The study did 
not consider whether an investment in charity would produce a commensurate or greater level 
of public goods. 
 155. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ALLOWING NONITEMIZERS TO 
DEDUCT CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS (2002) [hereinafter 2002 CBO REPORT], available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4008/12-13-CharitableGiving.pdf. The report 
was prepared at the request of the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee 
and provides a history of the standard deduction. It also examines patterns of giving and the 
tax incentives provided in the Code. 
 156. See id. at 5, 22. 
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The report also modeled four proposals, including allowing (1) 
unlimited above-the-line deductions, (2) deductions up to $100, (3) 
deductions above a $250 floor, and (4) deductions up to 2% of 
AGI.157 Given the difference in the proposals analyzed, it is hard to 
compare the Urban Institute Report to the CBO report, but the 
conclusion of the CBO report is that the proposals would not 
generate a rise in giving sufficient to justify the costs.158 
Whatever the reason, Congress has not enacted any of these 
proposals,159 and the charitable deduction remains a blunted 
instrument, unavailable to a large percentage of Americans who 
either will not or cannot donate sufficient funds to charity to make 
itemizing attractive. 
V. CHARITABLE FSAS 
Assuming that Congress is not simply being cynical in its 
decision to offer FSAs and a charitable deduction, it seems 
appropriate to try to make these provisions as effective as possible. 
Given the repeated failures to reform FSAs by removing the use-it-
or-lose-it feature and to move the charitable deduction above the 
line, it seems clear that another way forward is needed. In this Part, I 
propose combining FSAs with the charitable deduction, with the 
goal of improving both. In particular, I propose that taxpayers be 
allowed to donate any unused funds in an FSA to charity at year-end. 
To limit the possibility that this proposal would simply afford a 
deduction for giving that already occurs, taxpayers would be allowed 
to select only one charity as recipient.160 Plan administrators would 
simply forward any money left in such accounts year-end to the 
designated charity. 
 
 157. See id. at 19. 
 158. Another important difference between the reports is that the 2002 CBO REPORT, 
supra note 155, assumed lower elasticity of giving than did the URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT, 
supra note 148. 
 159. There have also been numerous calls to convert from deductions to tax credits, both 
to remedy the upside-down subsidy problem Surrey identified and to allow all taxpayers to 
receive tax benefits for donating to charity. See, e.g., Todd Izzo, Comment, A Full Spectrum of 
Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2371 (1993). 
However, to date, this approach has not gained traction either. 
 160. While giving through FSAs could displace existing giving, the residual nature of the 
donation coupled with the fact that one could only give to a single organization make this a 
poor substitute for the types of giving in which many engage. 
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Not all charities or charitable purposes are created equal, and 
some may object to money saved for health care needs going to the 
local opera. To address such concerns, Congress could also limit the 
types of charities to which donations could be made. Consistent with 
the purpose for which the amounts were originally set aside, 
Congress could allow taxpayers to designate only health-care related 
charities or those that help the poor. Or, Congress could provide 
that unused amounts be donated to a fund that would subsidize the 
now mandatory health insurance for those who cannot afford it, in 
effect creating a charity to receive unused FSA funds.161 
Combining these two provisions offers several benefits that the 
stand-alone fixes attempted to date do not. From a health care 
perspective, if taxpayers know that unused funds will go to a charity 
of their choosing—as opposed to their employers’ pockets—they 
may be more likely to increase the amount they save for medical 
needs. This likelihood includes both a probable increase in the 
number of eligible people electing to participate and in the amounts 
participants set aside. The proposal would also likely reduce the time 
people spend each year determining how much to set aside. For 
those who contribute too much, the proposal will likely lessen the 
incentive at year-end to spend unused money on unneeded items or 
services. 
From a charitable-giving perspective, nonitemizers would receive 
the functional equivalent of an above-the-line deduction for such 
donations. Indeed, it is better than an above-the-line deduction 
because amounts contributed to FSAs are not subject to payroll 
taxes. Because donated funds will already have been excluded from 
income, there would be no need for taxpayers to report the donation 
or claim a deduction, thus preserving the simplifying benefits 
associated with the standard deduction. It is also likely to be less 
costly than moving the deduction—or parts of it—above the line 
because, as discussed below, it seems more likely to afford a tax 
benefit to new giving than for giving that already occurs. 
The remainder of this Part describes how the proposal could be 
implemented and then evaluates it from both policy and political 
perspectives. 
 
 161. Limiting the donations in this way is not necessary and indeed could be counter-
productive if taxpayers are disinclined to donate to the allowed charities. I take no position on 
whether Congress should limit donations in this way. 
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A. Implementing the Proposal 
A key benefit of this proposal is that it does not require 
congressional action. First, allowing a donation to charity would not 
implicate the deferred compensation bar found in I.R.C. § 125(d) 
because the donation in Year 2 of amounts contributed to an FSA in 
Year 1 should not be considered compensation. Even if it were, the 
delay of a few months after the end of the year would no more 
constitute deferred compensation than the current rules permitting 
taxpayers a 2.5 month grace period in which to spend their FSA 
dollars. Second, as noted above, nothing in the nature of insurance 
prevents rollovers or the donation of unused premiums to charity. 
Thus, the Treasury Department could administratively amend the 
rules to allow such contributions without running afoul of I.R.C. §§ 
106 and 125. 
Having said that, the time is ripe for Congress to revisit FSAs 
and recharacterize them as tax-favored savings accounts, consistent 
with how people view them. From the perspective of most 
participants, FSAs operate much the same as HSAs. Participants 
contribute their own money to an account and later withdraw it by 
submitting receipts for eligible medical expenses. The only 
differences in the eyes of most taxpayers is that FSAs are subject to a 
number of rules that make them unattractive to use, and FSAs don’t 
allow taxpayers to invest the funds as they wish. Most taxpayers 
would be shocked to discover that the government views FSAs as a 
form of insurance. So long as premiums for FSAs equal coverage, the 
formal distinction between FSAs and HSAs is hard to maintain. 
Tax-favored savings accounts did not exist when Congress 
opened the door for FSAs by creating cafeteria plans, and framing 
the accounts as insurance was the only way they could fit within the 
then-existing statutory framework. Now that such accounts exist, 
Congress can and should reclassify FSAs. Doing so would not only 
exempt the accounts from the ban against deferred compensation 
found in I.R.C. § 125(d),162 but it would also relieve the Treasury 
Department of the need to create and enforce taxpayer-unfriendly 
rules necessary to make the plans look like insurance. 
In response to the concern that recognizing FSAs as tax-favored 
savings accounts would improperly allow taxpayers to deduct their 
 
 162. See I.R.C. §125(d)(2)(D) (2006). 
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first dollar of medical expenses, in direct conflict with the policy set 
forth in I.R.C. § 213 which prohibits deductions below a set floor, I 
would note that exempting employer-provided health insurance and 
amounts contributed to Archer MSAs and HSAs from income also 
contravenes this policy. Insurance payments are nothing more than 
ex ante medical costs. Assuming no uninsured expenses, allowing the 
first dollar of insurance benefits to be excluded from income is the 
same as allowing a deduction for the first dollar spent on medical 
needs.163 
Arguably, insurance and HSAs are worthy of an exception to the 
general policy of I.R.C. § 213 because we want to encourage people 
to negotiate for health insurance and buy high-deductible policies. 
However, if we classify FSAs as a form of employer-provided 
insurance and justify exclusion from income on those grounds, then 
the justification for exempting insurance premiums from income 
applies equally to amounts contributed to FSAs. If we think of FSAs 
as savings accounts, they facilitate the purchase of high-deductible 
health insurance by affording a tax benefit for amounts paid up to 
the deductible limit, thus encouraging people to monitor their 
spending. 
B. FSAs 
Implicit in the unsuccessful efforts to allow rollovers is the belief 
that low participation rates are a result of the forfeiture provision.164 
The obvious solution is simply to allow rollovers, but the Treasury 
Department has indicated that it feels bound by its prior rulings and 
Congressional inaction in light of those rulings. Congress has had 
numerous opportunities to act and has refused to do so, suggesting 
that a second best solution may be called for, one that either does 
not require congressional action or that is more likely to garner 
political support. 
 
 163. If we were serious about maintaining a floor on the exclusion of medical spending, 
we would exempt only those amounts paid for insurance above the floor. 
 164. People may underfund or decide to pass on FSAs altogether because they are risk or 
loss averse or are frozen by the uncertainty surrounding the outcome. Some may refrain from 
participating because they believe the hassle of keeping track of medical spending and 
submitting receipts outweighs the tax savings. It may be that the combination of these two 
issues is really to blame. Unfortunately, no empirical evidence exists on why people refrain 
from participating. 
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My proposal avoids or at least alleviates the forfeiture penalty 
without requiring Congress to act, though legislation adopting the 
proposal is the preferred course. For those who regularly donate to 
charity, donating unused FSA amounts to charity is nothing more 
than an extension of a practice in which they already engage. Such 
taxpayers are not likely to see such donations as a forfeiture and are 
more likely to fund their accounts consistent with their anticipated 
medical needs. If they do not itemize, they will also get a tax benefit 
for donating which they currently do not receive. Those who do not 
normally donate to charity are more likely to view a donation to the 
charity of their choice as better than forfeiting unused amounts to 
their employer, though they may view keeping the money to spend 
on themselves as better yet and thus not change their behavior in 
response to the proposal. Those who give may also receive the 
benefits that research suggests come from donating to charity.165 
Reducing barriers to FSAs is also consistent with a healthcare 
policy aimed at lowering medical costs. Health insurance presents a 
moral hazard because people have less incentive to monitor their 
medical spending. FSAs lessen the cost of being uninsured or 
carrying insurance with a high deductible, thus depressing the 
market for insurance.166 Moreover, because FSAs are tied to 
employment, the subsidies for FSAs are likely to be targeted at those 
who receive health insurance tax-free. To the extent that one believes 
the subsidy for health insurance is inefficient because it causes people 
to overinsure, expanding the use of this countervailing subsidy could 
be welfare-maximizing. 
It is important to consider whether the proposal could have 
unintended negative consequences. Will employers stop offering 
FSAs if they are no longer allowed to keep forfeited funds? The 
answer depends on the extent to which companies rely on forfeited 
amounts to cover the costs of such programs. Employers potentially 
incur two kinds of costs associated with FSAs. The first is 
administrative, including internal costs associated with managing 
 
 165. See Thomas, supra note 102, at 271–92 (“Social scientists make the connection 
between volunteerism (i.e., doing for others) and the cultivation of compassion and civility in 
the individual volunteer. This research finds that there are emotional and physical health 
benefits that inure to the well-being of the volunteer.”). See generally Lalin Anik et al., Feeling 
Good About Giving: The Benefits (and Costs) of Self-Interested Charitable Behavior (Harv. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 10–012, 2009), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/ 
pdf/10-012.pdf. 
 166. See supra Part II.C. 
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enrollment, advising employees, and managing reimbursements. If 
the employer retains a benefits company to administer claims,167 it 
will incur external costs as well. It is difficult to know how much a 
company spends internally on FSAs. Usually, these plans are offered 
in conjunction with a variety of other benefits, and it would be hard 
to disaggregate marginal costs associated with offering an FSA. 
Where companies contract out administration of the program to a 
third party, the monthly cost comes to about $3 per participant, for 
an annual cost of around $36 for each employee who contributes to 
an FSA,168 which is consistent with the fees charged by institutions 
that offer HSAs.169 
The second kind of cost involves “experience loss,” i.e., 
situations where an employee makes a claim and is reimbursed, and 
then leaves the company before he or she contributes the full 
amount into his or her account. No data exists on how often this 
occurs or how much money is involved. That said, it is hard to 
imagine that such losses are significant. The soon-to-be-
implemented caps ensure that the loss cannot exceed $2500 for any 
one employee. 
Relying on the survey results reported above in Part III, it is 
possible to estimate the cost of offering an FSA. For instance, if we 
assume a company with 2500 employees and a 40% participation 
rate,170 that company will have approximately 1000 participants in its 
FSA who will contribute $1,300 on average to their accounts, for a 
total of $1,300,000. If the company hires an outside firm to 
administer the plan, it will incur out-of-pocket costs of 
approximately $36,000 in addition to internal administrative costs 
associated with the plan. It may also suffer some experience losses 
when employees leave mid-year. The total cost of offering an FSA 
should be relatively low. For our purposes, let’s assume a total cost, 
including internal costs, external costs, and experience loss, of 
$50,000. 
 
 167. See, e.g., ASIFLEX, http://www.asiflex.com/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011) (ASIFlex 
provides FSA administration).  
 168. See, e.g., Contract Between Arizona Board of Regents and Application Software, 
Inc., at app. A, (setting the rates for 2011 at $3 per month per participant) (on file with 
author). 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 170. This participation rate is double the national average. See supra note 4. 
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It is also possible to determine the revenue stream and cost 
savings associated with offering an FSA. The data suggests that the 
number of people who currently forfeit money and the amounts that 
they forfeit are quite low. As noted above, a large majority of 
employers report that fewer than 7% of their employees forfeit 
money, and the average amount forfeited is less than $100,171 
though anecdotal evidence suggests that some taxpayers forfeit 
significant sums. If we assume that 5% of the participants at the 
company described above forfeit $100, the total amount forfeited 
would be $5000. This amount would defray about 10% of the costs 
of offering an FSA, suggesting that companies must have other 
means available to fund their plans. 
One source of funds is the tax breaks that companies receive 
from participating in FSAs. Amounts contributed to FSAs are 
exempt from both income and payroll taxes.172 Thus, companies do 
not need to pay payroll taxes on contributed amounts. The 
employer’s portion of payroll taxes is 7.65%.173 Returning again to 
our 2500 employee firm, if we assume that the 1000 participants 
contribute on average $1300, for a total of $1,300,000, the 
company saves $99,450 in taxes. These tax savings far exceed the 
costs of administering an FSA, making such accounts financially 
attractive to employers, even if the company is not allowed to retain 
forfeited amounts. To the extent that employees increase 
participation in FSAs as a result of this proposal, the tax savings 
should increase. For every $400 in increased participation, the 
company would save about $32 in payroll taxes, just about covering 
the annual external cost of one participant. 
Should tax savings—whether participation remains unchanged or 
increases—be insufficient to cover the costs of offering FSAs, 
amounts lost as a result of this proposal could be made up through 
fees charged to plan participants, as is done with HSAs.174 Indeed, 
from an equity perspective, using fees to fund the program would be 
an improvement over the current system, as it would apportion the 
costs based on a per-person basis and not based on the accuracy at 
 
 171. INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 6.  
 172. See I.R.C. §§ 105, 3121(a)(2) (2006). 
 173. See  I.R.C. § 3101(a) (2006). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
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predicting one’s medical expenses.175 Thus, it seems highly unlikely 
that companies will drop FSAs if this proposal is adopted. 
C. The Charitable Deduction 
Those opposed to moving the charitable deduction above the 
line have generally raised five arguments.176 The first is economic. 
The second is based on administrative convenience. The third is 
based on fairness. The fourth is a concern about the effect on 
volunteerism. The fifth is based on efficiency. In this Subpart, I 
evaluate this proposal in light of these objections, comparing it to 
prior reform efforts where appropriate. 
The first objection to moving the charitable deduction above the 
line is that it would be too costly.177 At a time of great deficits, one 
must be careful not to exacerbate the problem. This argument rings 
somewhat hollow in light of the decision to renew the Bush tax cuts 
for two additional years, which are projected to add approximately 
$3.9 trillion to the deficit over the next ten years.178 However, the 
recent fight over raising the debt ceiling suggests that Congress may 
be serious about this. Regardless, the question isn’t solely about how 
much it costs, but rather whether it produces a net societal gain. 
Surprisingly little research has been done attempting to identify the 
requisite level or mix of public goods or whether the charitable 
deduction as currently structured provides a sufficient subsidy to 
produce those goods. At best, the data attempts to predict increased 
charitable giving relative to cost.179 
 
 175. Using fees is not without risk. Unlike forfeited amounts, which taxpayers may or 
may not suffer, fees would be explicit and certain. Some taxpayers might resist participating, 
even if on a net basis they benefited from the program. Those who use up all their FSA funds 
currently pay nothing for the program. If fees were levied on all participants, they would have 
to bear some cost. What effect explicit fees might have on participation is an empirical question 
that is difficult to answer. 
 176. In a 2001 article, Ellen Aprill considered whether moving the deduction above the 
line would be in the best interests of religious organizations and society more generally. See 
Aprill, supra note 95. While addressed primarily to religious organizations and focused on 
donations to such, the article provides a good framework to explore the issue of whether 
allowing people to donate unused amounts in health care FSAs to charity might be superior to 
moving part or all of the charitable deduction above the line. 
 177. See, e.g., 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 1. 
 178. See Ron Scherer, What Will Deal on Bush Tax Cuts Mean for the Federal Deficit? 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 6, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
USA/Politics/2010/1206/What-will-deal-on-Bush-tax-cuts-mean-for-the-federal-deficit. 
 179. See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 148; 2002 CBO REPORT, supra 
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Accepting cost arguments as made in good faith, my proposal is 
superior to moving the whole deduction above the line because it 
limits the total amount of charitable deductions allowed. The actual 
impact depends on how people respond to the proposal, but for any 
individual the additional above-the-line effect is capped at the 
marginal tax rate multiplied by the contribution limit, which will 
soon be set at $2500. If the additional incentive does not induce 
taxpayers to increase their participation or amounts contributed to 
FSAs, the effect on revenue collection would be limited to the small 
amounts that are currently forfeited and included in the employers’ 
tax base. If taxpayers increase their FSA contributions with only their 
healthcare needs in mind, the program’s cost will go up, but FSAs 
will come closer to fulfilling their purpose. It would be odd to argue 
against the proposal because it will make FSAs more effective, in line 
with their underlying purpose.180 
Finally, some may “take advantage” of the proposal by 
intentionally contributing more than their anticipated health care 
needs to an FSA with the goal of donating leftover amounts to 
charity. Setting aside the fact that this would increase amounts 
available for health care if necessary, such behavior would reduce 
income tax revenues only if (1) it displaces charitable giving for 
which no deduction is currently available,181 or (2) it represents 
additional giving. If the proposal spurs additional giving, it will have 
accomplished one of its goals. If taxpayers simply shift giving from a 
nondeductible to a deductible format, the proposal will have 
accomplished little, while decreasing government revenues. The 
 
note 155, at 7–9. 
 180. Presumably the government could design an incentive with the expectation that few 
would take advantage of it, hoping to score political points without actually providing the 
advertised benefits. Indeed, some suspect that the Child Tax Credit enacted during the Bush 
years partook of this. Legislators could claim they were giving people a credit, all the while 
knowing that income limits and the Alternative Minimum Tax would significantly restrict the 
number of beneficiaries. In the case of health care FSAs, this seems unlikely, as the prohibition 
against rollovers were created by the IRS’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 125’s antideferral rules. 
In any event, the better approach is to expressly limit the program to its intended targets, 
rather than make the program so cumbersome that people will not participate. 
 181. Because amounts contributed to health care FSAs are exempt from payroll taxes, 
taxpayers who itemize could choose to donate through health care FSAs instead of through 
currently deductible giving to avoid paying payroll taxes. This type of behavior would cost the 
government tax revenue. However, it would not be difficult to impose payroll taxes on those 
who itemize and donate through this mechanism to make such a strategy equivalent to regular 
donations. Indeed, to avoid giving nonitemizers an extra tax break, one could readily impose 
full payroll taxes on those who donate in this manner. 
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likelihood of this occurring is discussed more fully below in the 
discussion of efficiency. 
A second common objection to moving the charitable donation 
above the line is administrative.182 The whole point of the standard 
deduction was to eliminate the need to track itemized deductions. 
Were the charitable donation moved above the line, many of these 
simplification benefits would be lost. Indeed, these concerns were a 
leading reason why Congress decided to move the charitable 
deduction back under the line as part of the 1986 tax reforms.183 
Donating unused FSA amounts to charity would avoid this problem 
because the amounts would already have been excluded from 
employee income. They would automatically be transferred to 
charities at the end of the year. As a result, there would be no need 
for employees to document amounts or recipients, thus avoiding 
administrative difficulties normally associated with above-the-line 
and itemized deductions. For those taxpayers who use the FSA 
mechanism to reduce their itemized deductions below the amount of 
the standard deduction,184 the administrative burden would actually 
decrease. 
In an effort to reduce the cost of the charitable deduction, 
several of the proposals to date seek to limit the amount of charitable 
deductions taken above the line by using a floor or maximum 
amount. Such provisions add significant complexity to the Code, 
making tax planning difficult. The proposal offered in this Article is 
far easier to grasp and plan for. 
The third argument is based on fairness, i.e., that it is unfair to 
give itemizers an incentive to give, while denying the incentive to 
nonitemizers, but this argument is more difficult. Where two people 
give the same amounts to charity, it seems wrong that one gets a tax 
deduction because he has additional itemized deductions, such as 
home mortgage interest, while the other receives no deduction.185 
However, some amount for presumed charitable giving is included in 
the standard deduction. Thus, while nonitemizers get no direct 
incentive to give, their taxes are lowered as if they had given to 
 
 182. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 859–60. 
 183. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 3 (citing Amy E. Dunbar & John 
Phillips, The Effect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions: The Case of Nonitemizing 
Taxpayers, 19 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 5 (1997)). 
 184. See id. at 13. 
 185. See McDaniel, supra note 101, at 394. 
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charity. While the exact amount of their donations may not match 
the portion of the standard deduction associated with presumed 
charitable giving, they are certainly receiving some tax relief, and 
those who give little to charity get a greater tax benefit than they 
deserve. 
Even if they are not financially disadvantaged, nonitemizers 
could argue that the current rules are unfair because all taxpayers are 
not treated the same. The better path, they might argue, would be 
to reduce the standard deduction by some amount and allow all 
taxpayers to deduct some or all charitable giving above the line. 
However, such an approach would undermine many of the 
administrative benefits associated with the standard deduction. 
The fourth objection to moving the charitable deduction above 
the line is that it might affect volunteerism by making charitable 
donations more attractive relative to volunteering.186 This concern is 
addressed primarily to churches, which rely heavily on volunteerism 
and could suffer if people donate in lieu of volunteering. One who 
foregoes income by volunteering has no income and no deduction. 
In contrast, a taxpayer who earns money and then donates it to 
charity must report the income but gets no corresponding deduction 
if he takes the standard deduction. Thus, he is worse off than if he 
volunteers. Allowing an above-the-line deduction would put 
volunteering and donating on the same footing. 
Professor Ellen Aprill rejects this concern, concluding that 
donations and volunteering are more likely complements than 
substitutes.187 However, to the extent that this concern may have 
validity, this proposal avoids the tradeoff to some degree because the 
donation is residual, determined as of the end of the year. Volunteers 
cannot wait until the last day of the year to decide whether or how 
much to volunteer. Thus, it seems unlikely that allowing taxpayers to 
contribute unused FSA funds to charity will unduly suppress 
volunteering. 
Finally, there are a number of efficiency-based objections to 
moving the charitable deduction above the line. First, low-income 
taxpayers tend to give to religious organizations and do so for 
reasons entirely independent of receiving a government subsidy.188 
 
 186. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 862–64. 
 187. See id. at 863. 
 188. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 8. For a discussion of the Judeo-
Christian religious obligation to be charitable, see Adam S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and 
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They currently donate significant amounts without any subsidy.189 
Thus, there is no need for a government subsidy, at least for such 
taxpayers. Second, a number of studies suggest that low-income 
taxpayers are unlikely to increase their giving when offered a subsidy 
because their tax rate is low. In contrast, taxpayers in higher brackets 
are much more likely to increase giving in response to greater tax 
incentives. Third, because it is not clear the extent to which religious 
organizations create benefits for nonmembers, donations to such 
organizations may be different in kind from other types of donations 
and therefore less worthy of government subsidy.190 
As Aprill notes, the evidence on the second and third of these 
concerns is contradictory.191 With regard to self-serving donations, it 
is simply not possible to determine the societal benefits of donations 
to one’s church. However, if one is concerned about this, one could 
limit the types of charities eligible to receive unused FSA funds to 
those associated with health and medicine, consistent with the 
original purpose for setting the funds aside in the first place. 
With regard to the relative responsiveness of high- and low-
income taxpayers to subsidies, some studies suggest that low-income 
giving is far less responsive than high-income giving,192 because 
nonitemizers tend to have low marginal rates, thus blunting the tax 
incentives. In contrast, high-income taxpayers are responsive because 
they receive significant subsidies for their giving. Other reports find 
high elasticity among nonitemizers, suggesting that charitable giving 
would surge were nonitemizers given a tax incentive to do so.193 
 
the Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 153 (2007). 
 189. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 8 (“All of the $21 billion in 
contributions by taxpayers who claimed the standard deduction were made without any tax 
incentive.”). 
 190. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 865–66. 
 191. See id. at 859. 
 192. See John R. Robinson, Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving: A 
Reappraisal Using 1985 Itemizer and Nonitemizer Charitable Deduction Data, 12 J. AM. 
TAX’N ASS’N 39, 58 (1990). For a recent study on high-income taxpayer responsiveness to tax 
incentives, see Jon Bakija & Bradley Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives 
and Income? Dynamic Panel Estimates Accounting for Predictable Changes in Taxation 7 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14237, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14237. 
 193. See Yong S. Choe & Jinook Jeong, Charitable Contributions by Low- and Middle-
Income Taxpayers: Further Evidence with a New Method, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 33, 36 (1993); 
Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 183, at 18 (relying on data from 1982 to 1986, when 
nonitemizers were allowed to deduct charitable contributions above the line). But see, 2002 
CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 11 (noting the difficulty of disaggregating timing effects 
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Whether the tax incentive for low-income taxpayers is sufficient 
to spur additional giving is really something of a red herring. If low-
income taxpayers don’t respond to the incentive by giving more than 
they currently give, then the incentive will simply be ineffective. 
Instead, the efficiency of any proposal depends on the extent to 
which it subsidizes activities that are already taking place. Indeed, 
this is the chief problem the CBO identified with the proposals it 
considered in its 2002 report.194 The proposal here avoids or lessens 
the concerns that the government will be paying for existing giving, 
at least relative to moving the charitable deduction wholesale above 
the line. 
If we assume people contribute more to their FSAs in response 
to the proposal, consistent with the actual anticipated medical needs, 
it seems likely that any residual amounts donated to charity will be in 
addition to existing giving.195 Potentially more troubling is a scenario 
where taxpayers fund their FSAs at levels above their anticipated 
medical needs with the intent of donating any excess. If such 
contributions reflect additional giving, again there is no problem. 
However, if taxpayers displace donations they otherwise would have 
made but for which no or only reduced tax incentives were available, 
the proposal could increase costs without a commensurate increase in 
giving.196 
While some taxpayers may do this, several elements of the 
proposal suggest that donating through an FSA is not a good 
substitute for other types of giving, and therefore this may not be as 
big a problem as it appears. To begin with, the proposal allows 
 
associated with changes in the law from normal incentive effects); Peter J. Frischmann, 
Discussion of the Effect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions: The Case of Nonitemizing 
Taxpayers, 19 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 21 (1997) (cautioning against reading too much into the 
Dunbar and Phillips findings). 
 194. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 2 (“All four options would be likely to 
increase overall contributions by less than 4%, and their primary effect, as is the case with most 
deductions, would be to reward taxpayers for their existing behavior.”). 
 195. Increased funding of health care FSAs should not displace charitable giving because 
healthcare expenses will have to be met regardless. Increased use of FSAs simply provides a tax-
exempt way to do so. 
 196. In some cases, taxpayers who would otherwise have itemized may elect the standard 
deduction if their charitable donations are handled through an FSA. According to the 2002 
CBO Report, as of 1997, moving $200 of donations above the line for joint filers could cause 
450,000 filers to claim a benefit without changing giving. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 
155, at 12. The projected revenue losses from those switching from itemizing to taking the 
standard deduction ranged from $50 to $300 million per year, depending on plan considered. 
See id. 
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taxpayers to designate only one charity as the recipient of unused 
FSA funds. Taxpayers who routinely give to more than one charity 
would not find this approach adequate. If Congress were to limit the 
possible recipients of such funds, the incentive to alter giving 
patterns would be even further reduced. In addition, amounts given 
through this mechanism are residual. Thus, taxpayers who are intent 
on ensuring that their specific charity receives a set amount will be 
better served by giving directly to the charity. Further, if one is truly 
concerned that a significant number of taxpayers will shift their 
giving, one could reduce the standard deduction by some ratio of 
the amount donated in this manner, though this would add 
additional complexity. Finally, if people do shift their giving patterns 
to donate through FSAs, they will necessarily be setting aside money 
that could be used for health care needs, consistent with the purpose 
of having FSAs. 
This discussion brings up one concern that should be addressed: 
is there a chance that this proposal could actually decrease charitable 
giving? For instance, if taxpayers displace existing giving with giving 
through FSAs, there is a risk that they could treat the FSA as a 
wasting fund, where charity only receives what is left at the end of 
the year. If a taxpayer’s health care needs exceeded expectations, 
charity would receive less than anticipated. Several factors suggest 
that this is not likely to happen. 
First, many people give throughout the year, as requests come in. 
Donating residual amounts left in an FSA is a poor substitute for this 
practice. Second, the limitation of one charitable recipient would 
likely preclude taxpayers from seeing FSAs as a perfect substitute for 
their normal charitable giving. Third, and perhaps most important, a 
large number of givers are target oriented, establishing at the 
beginning of the year how much they intend to give. Those who 
give for religious purposes often seek to donate 10% of their income 
to charity.197 Such taxpayers are unlikely to reduce the total amount 
given to charity because they have an alternate and contingent means 
of giving. If they shift some of their charitable giving to the FSA and 
discover at year’s end that they have unexpectedly used it to cover 
health care costs, they can always adjust the amount of non-FSA 
donations to meet their goals. While they may need to wait until the 
 
 197. This behavior is consistent with the notion that some portion of nonitemized giving 
is inelastic. For a discussion of the Jewish practice of tithing and the origin of the 10% figure, 
see Chodorow, supra note 188. 
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end of the year to make such adjustments, many taxpayers already do 
this.198 
D. Political Considerations 
In today’s political climate, it is not enough simply to put 
forward an idea and show that it advances a policy goal and is 
economically feasible. It is also necessary to demonstrate that it has a 
real possibility of being enacted. This proposal should garner 
significant support among politicians, charitable organizations, and 
frustrated taxpayers, while engendering little opposition. 
First, the proposal should be popular with politicians, regardless 
of their political leanings. Both Republican and Democratic 
administrations have sponsored proposals to make the charitable 
deduction more widely available by moving at least portions of the 
deduction above the line.199 Moreover, both parties have railed 
against the complexity of the tax laws and the burdens imposed on 
those trying to make sensible economic decisions. Softening the 
forfeiture barrier to using FSAs would significantly reduce taxpayer 
frustration at a fairly low cost and therefore should be politically 
popular. In sum, this is the type of proposal that should receive 
bipartisan support—no mean feat in the current political 
environment. 
Second, the proposal should garner significant popular support. 
Not only will it appeal to nonitemizers seeking a subsidy for 
donating to charity, but it will also appeal to the millions of 
Americans who face the annual frustration of trying to figure out 
how much to contribute to FSAs. Third, the charitable lobby should 
support this proposal as it is likely to increase charitable giving. This 
lobby is well organized and should be a valuable ally in pushing for 
the proposal. Working together, these constituencies have a better 
chance of getting this legislation passed than they have had working 
separately on stand-alone provisions. 
 
 198. Indeed, one can predict that target savers may increase their donations. Targets are 
normally minimums. Under current rules, once amounts are committed to health care FSAs, 
they are sunk costs. Taxpayers who fund their health care FSAs to meet expected medical needs 
and then donate unused amounts are no worse off than if they had used the FSA moneys for 
medical needs. It is not at all clear that they will cut back other giving in light of their good 
medical fortune. 
 199. See supra Part IV.B. 
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The one group likely to oppose the proposal is employers, who 
stand to lose the amounts that would otherwise have been forfeited 
to them. That said, the total amount forfeited each year for any given 
employer is relatively small. Employers who offer FSAs are almost 
certainly financially ahead as a result of payroll tax savings described 
above. While employers should get some financial incentive to offer 
FSAs, the claim that they should get to keep forfeited amounts in 
addition to tax savings is less than compelling, especially when 
compared to the alternative use of such amounts to fund charities. 
Should they somehow be able to demonstrate that FSAs are not 
economically viable absent forfeited amounts, introducing fees to 
replace such amounts offers a far more equitable means of funding 
FSAs. Thus, employer opposition could readily be diffused should it 
arise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior efforts to reform the FSA and charitable deduction 
provisions—by allowing taxpayers to rollover unused amounts in 
FSAs and moving the charitable deduction above the line—have 
failed. This Article offers a new way forward. Allowing taxpayers to 
donate unused funds in an FSA at the end of the year to charity may 
improve the efficacy of both provisions by creating new incentives for 
people to donate to charity, while removing, or at least softening, 
the risk of forfeiture associated with FSAs. While the proposal could 
be implemented administratively, the better path is to have Congress 
revisit FSAs and conform their legal status to the way people view 
and use them. 
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